Mythological Paradigm

Humans in primitive societies never doubted their belonging to the world of life that we call “the biosphere.” Hunter-gatherer bands, like communitiesof animals, formed part of natural ecosystems. Dances, rock art, and religious rites emphasized similar features of humans and animals. Moreover, animals were often regarded by humans as related to them. Legends about humans that could understand animal languagesstill exist in numerous humansocieties. People believed in totems—their mythological forefathers (animals, plants, or celestial bodiesthat were regarded as living things as well). Every living thing was thought to have its own spirit. Before hunting, for example, a bear, primitive inhabitants of the Arctic Region asked its spirit to forgive them. Myths about the creation of the world including life and humanity were centered on the activities of mystical heroes often having animal images. For instance, the duck called Luvr created the land amidst the primeval ocean according to the myths of some tribes in Northern Siberia.

Widespread in Ancient Egypt, India, and pre-classical Greeceincluding the Creto-Minoan and the Mycenian cultures were biomorphic (resembling living things) mythological images. The cat-like goddess Bast(is) played a major part in the Egyptian pantheon. The Indian culturewas characterized by a special protective attitude toward plantsand animals that were regarded as sacred beings (as witnessed by the Ayurveda).

Cretan vases at the beginning of the second millennium B.C. were adorned with biomorphic and particularly zoomorphic (resembling, or related to, animals) images, such as octopi and other aquatic animals (Fig. 1.1). A large number of zoomorphic mythological personages were deified in the Mycenian epoch (the second half of the second millennium B.C.) and later incorporated in the pantheon of the Antique Greece. Myths involving biomorphic images in conjunction with empirical observations were subsequently rationalized and systematized, providing the foundationsfor the first scientific theories based on the natural-philosophy paradigm.

Historically, natural philosophy can be considered a result of ancient mythology, a result of reformulating mythological ideas in logical terms. Despite the differences among various natural-philosophy theories developed in Greece, Rome, the Medieval and Renaissance Europe, the Middle East, India, and China, natural philosophy was informed by common basic ideas emphasizing the central role of life in the world. From the natural-philosophy viewpoint, the whole Universe was based upon unitary principles. In Ancient Greece, most philosophers believed that the four primary elements—Fire, Water, Air, and Earth—combined to form any living or non-living object. They were related to the four fluids of the humanorganism(blood, lymph/phlegm, bile, and “black bile”) as well as to the four human temperaments (the sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric, and melancholic, respectively). The life of humans and animals (plants, etc.) was believed to be based on the same universal principles/elements and, therefore, a researcher was actually similar to the living being he studied.

Natural philosophy prepared the ground for scientific ideas that are to be considered “pre-biopolitical” in retrospect. The natural-philosophy concept of a coherent, homogenous, life-imbued Universe encouraged scholars to draw analogies between humans and other living beings. In the sixth century B.C., Ionian philosophers in Greecesaw no principal differences between animal and humansouls. Heraclites (Heraclitus) only admitted that an animal soul was more “humid” and, therefore, compared it to the soul of an alcoholic that was “moistened” with wine. As early as in antiquity, the concept of “man’s biological nature” was invoked to justify social inequality. Slaves were thought to be “naturally” predisposed to perform their functions. Specific female roles in societywere also attributed to natural peculiarities of women supposed to be mentally retarded to some extent.

Comparisons between humanand animal behavioras well as anthropomorphic imagesof animals were characteristic of works by Democritus, Epicures, Lucretius, Plutarch, and some neo-Platonists (e.g., Porphyrus).

Nevertheless, another antique trend of thought emphasized the differences between animals driven by instincts (ήand humans endowed with a reasonable soul. These views were, for example, adopted by the Stoics. This trend in philosophy and scienceprovided a conceptual basis for medieval theology that contrasted humans, having immortal souls, with other creatures.

Aristotlealready acknowledged the difference between humans possessing “reasonable souls” and animals endowed only with “vegetative” and “sensitive” souls. However, Aristotle also emphasized human-animal similarities, particularly in terms of social organization. His term “political animals” () referred, apart from human beings, to social insectsand birdsthat also cooperate in order to do collective work. Aristotle pointed out that some “political animals” have leaders in their groups, while others are “leaderless.” Interestingly, this point has been recently re-emphasized by ethologists and biopoliticians who discuss hierarchical and non-hierarchical structures in animal and human societies (see Chapter 3).

Importantly, Aristotle’s opinion on this and many other subjects, along with the views held by Plato, Hippocrates, Galen, and Plinius, was generally accepted in European and Middle Eastcountries in the Middle Ages and went unchallenged for more than a millennium. This increased the stabilityand durabilityof the whole natural-philosophy paradigm.

Natural philosophy adherents of various historical periods emphasized similarities between biological and political systems. The statewas compared to a living organismand social classes to its organs. The slaveswere called the “hands” of the state “organism,” and its supreme ruler was its “head.” The rich and non-productive social classeswere considered the “stomach.” There are ancient fables that stressthe interdependenceof the “organs” of the state. In one of the fables, the “hands” refused to work for the “stomach” and died together with it.

The idea that the stateis an analog of a living organismis still supported by some schools in political scienceand sociology(see, e.g., Franchuk, 2005).

1.3.1.3. Theological Paradigm

The spreading of Christianityin Europeat the beginning of the new era promoted the development of the new theological paradigm. The issue of the nature-humankind relationship was reconsidered on the basis of the idea that both nature and humankind were created by God.

Since much attention was paid to the difference between humanbeings with immortal souls and other, soul-less, “creatures,” scholars were discouraged from drawingcomparisons between them. Moreover, the founding fathers of the church urged Christiansto concentrate upon God. Studying the “Creation” per se, unless driven by sinful curiosity (the lust of your eyes, according to St. Augustine), was only permissible if aimed at understanding the Immortal and Eternal and not at satisfying the futile and transient quest for knowledge, as Thomas Aquinas asserted. Hence, living beings were of interest only in terms of symbols and allegories. The lamb, fishand the grape vine symbolized Christ.

The symbolical perception of nature, nonetheless, allowed for some comparisons between living organisms and the political systemof humansociety. In terms of the medieval worldview, it seemed natural to draw on organismic metaphors that were earlier used by both Platoand Aristotle. In the Middle Ages, such metaphors were re-emphasized by Marsilio from Padua, who regarded the stateas a “living being.” “John of Salisbury, in Policratus (c.1159) argued that society was like a biological organism. The commonwealth was the body, with the king as its head, the church as its soul, and all other members of the body politicsperforming lesser functions” (quotation from: Somit & Peterson, 2011, p. 4). Similar analogies are contained in the works by Thomas Aquinas. Medieval Christian theology took it for granted that the Universe in its perfection existed for the benefit of human beings (as Raymond of Sabund claimed). This lent support to the idea that manhas the dominant status in the world.

Catholic (and, subsequently, Protestant) theology preached the supremacy of humankind in the Universe. In the opinion of the non-traditional (“environmental”) clergy of the 20th century, whichincluded Kenneth Bouling and Lynn White, this promoted aggressive and exploitative attitudesto nature and finally caused the present-day ecological crisis. As early as in the Middle Ages, a theological justificationwas provided for the ruthless exploitationof the biospherethat has been characteristic of the recent scientific and technological epoch.

However, Kennet Cauthen, who produced the book Christian Biopolitics (1971), believed that Christianityalso included a quite different trend of thought. It promoted a more “biopolitical” attitude toward life. Although acknowledging the difference between the status of humans and of other life forms, it emphasized the oneness of manwith the whole creation and his responsibility for it. Cauthen (1997) analyzed relevant sections of the Bible, particularly the famous words of the Lord: “Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fishof the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth” (Genesis, 1:28; Bible, King James Version). He drew the conclusion that the Bible did not encourage people to just exploit nature. Instead, it called on humankind to take care of all creatures on the Earth as well as to take the responsibility for them. Only on this condition may humans use natural resourcesfor their benefit. Of special interest were the views and practical activities of Francis from Assisi, the founder of the Franciscan Order. Apart from his other merits (including an extremely ascetic, pious lifestyle), he was renowned for the care he took of animals and for his convictionthat all animals and plantsconstantly praised Godin their special ways.

1.3.1.4. Mechanistic Paradigm

Mechanism took shapein the 16th-17th century in Europeas an alternative to both natural philosophy and medieval theology. The advocates of this paradigm, including philosophers (Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hobbes) and scientists (for example, Borelli, Silvius, and Hoffman), compared living organisms to automatons, machines, or mechanisms (hence, the term mechanism was applied to the whole philosophical paradigm). An exception was made for humans who had a dual status. The humanbodywas a mechanism (“the extended thing,” or res extensa, in Rene Descartes’ words), but the mind enabling manto think was res cogitans, or “the thinking thing.”

Accordingly, comparisons between humans and other forms of life confined themselves to anatomyand primitive physiology. Descartes and other mechanicists admitted that animals and humans displayed common primitive behavior forms (that were later termed reflexes) such as withdrawing the hand from a hot object. Descartes assumed that, like the cardiovascular system, the nervous systemconsists of tubes containing “fluids” and a central “pump.” He also attempted to manufacture a “mechanical duck.” J. Borelli sought to explain the locomotive behavior of animals in terms of mechanical statics.

In contrast to Aristoteles, Thomas Hobbesasserted that comparing humansocietywith animal communities(e.g., an ant colony) made no sense. He argued in his work called Leviathan that animal communities function according to natural laws(unconsciously obeyed by all animals), whereas the functioning of human society depends on agreements reached by people concerned about their interests. Unlike animals, humans are reasonable, selfish, and calculating beings. In order to make them cooperate for the benefit of the whole society, contracts between them should be reinforced by a strong political power(the Leviathan).

By criticizing Aristotle, Hobbes’ made an important contribution to the trend of thought that contrasted nature with nurture and the natural scienceswith the humanities. This trend of thought is still sufficiently popular with natural scientists and scholars in the humanities alike. They still doubt the validity of comparisons between humans and other creatures, forcing biopoliticians to keep their powder dry.

Although the natural-philosophy paradigm seems to be more consistent with biopolitics than the mechanistic paradigm, mechanism also contributed to preparing the ground for biopolitics. Descartes’ comparisons of humans and animals with respect to primitive behavioral responses and nervous “fluids” actually foreshadowed more recent comparative research on humanand animal neurology. This laid the foundationsfor a large number of biopolitical studies. A prerequisite for understanding human behavioris research on the operation of the central behavior-controlling unit, i.e., the brain. The subfield of modern biopolitics dealing with neurology is, therefore, related to the originally Cartesian concepts of “fluids” and “reflexes.”

In various historical periods, some biologists revived the natural-philosophy paradigm. For example, a natural-philosophy schoolof thought flourished in Germanyin the late 18th and the early 19th century (including Schelling, Herder, Goethe, Oken, Treviranus, etc.). Herder regarded the historyof humansocietyas a part of the history of nature as a whole. In his opinion, humans and apes were just two stages of the same process. Not surprisingly, he emphasized the similarity of the brainstructurein humans and orangutans.

Importantly, he compared the whole nature to one living organism. John Hutton, one of the pioneers of geography, wrote in 1788: “I consider the Earth a superorganism, and it should be studied by physiologists” (quoted from: Corning, 2003b). Interestingly, the term “superorganism” is still in use. For example, it was revived by William Wheeler (1926) in his work on social insects. More recently, the American biopolitician Peter Corning extensively used the term in his publications.

In the 19th century, the German scientists Theodor Schwann and Matthias Schleiden suggested the cellular theory maintaining that an animal or plant organismis a congregation of cells, the elementary units of life. Within its framework, Rudolph Wirchow compared a multicellular organism to a political body, a “cell state.” This idea was discarded as mere natural-philosophy speculationand ignored by most scientists, until quite recently.

However, the attitude toward Wirchow’s metaphorchanged in the previous decades. The contemporary cytologist Yu. Vasiliev (2000, p. 189) points out that “each cell in our body and in all other multicellular organismsis… part of a highly complex society. As early as 100 years ago, the famous German pathologistR. Wirchow termed our organism‘a cell state.’ In a state, as well as in an organism, the behavior of an individual (a humanor a cell) is reasonable and normal as long as he adequately responds to social signalsemitted by other society members. A person who fails to respond to social signals often becomes a criminal. A cell that inadequately responds to signals may give rise to a tumor” (Fig. 1.2).

Despite its limitations (and protests against it), we should admit that mechanism was a sufficiently fruitful scientific paradigm for its epoch. Moreover, it opened up new potentialities for “pre-biopolitical” comparative studies of humanbeings and animals. Of particular importance was the 18th century idea that the capacity to respond to stimuli, “to perceive” them, is a universal property of life. Apart from “reflexes,” more sophisticated forms of behavior and mental phenomena—including human thinking—were reconsidered in mechanistic terms, thanks to the works by the French enlightenment school. These mechanistic views were sometimes driven to the extreme. Cabanis likened the brainto the stomach. The “food” was provided by the sensory organs, while thoughts, in his mind, were analogs of “feces.” La Mettrie compared the psyche of humans and of various animals. He argued that the boundary between the realms of animals and humans was somewhat unclear and arbitrary. Reaumur, in his Natural History of Insects, viewed animals as reasonable beings whose social organizationresembled that of human society.

It should be emphasized that the German philosopher Gottfried von Leibniz believed that not only the humanbody(according to Descartes) but also the soul resembled an automaton. From this idea, it seemed to follow that it was possible to create artificial intelligencesystems, “thinking automatons,” or Homme Machine in French. These views were promoted, for instance, by La Mettrie, and they inspired Jacques de Vaucanson to design an automaton that could play a flute. Thus, the mechanistic approach to life gave rise to the idea that it was possible to intentionally create living organisms and even artificial intelligence. This foreshadowed the recent Foucauldian interpretation of biopolitics as biopowerthat enables modifying the human body on purpose.

Holbach, in the work entitled The System of Nature and originally published under the name of de Mirabaud (1st English edition: 1820), stated that manis a product of nature, he exists in nature, obeys its laws, and cannot go beyond nature even in his imagination. This statement contains the main idea of naturalism that views humankind and humansocietyas part of nature.

1.3.1.5. Evolutionary Paradigm

Carl Linnaeus, the 18th century Swedish scientist who provided the foundationsfor modern biological systematics, believed that biological speciesdo not change in time because they all were once created by God. Nevertheless, it was in the 18th century that the idea took rootthat species undergo radical changes during the historyof life on the Earth. The supporters of this idea, such as B. de Maillet, were originally called transformists.

Evolutionism per se took shapeby the beginning of the 19th century. It centered on evolutionas the directional, progressive historical development of life that resulted in the formationof the Earth’s bio-diversityand the emergence of humankind. The great evolutionist Jean Batiste Lamarck considered the inherent drive of living organisms to perfection one of the major driving forces of evolution. The other factor was “inheriting acquired traits”: if a giraffe constantly stretches its neck, its offspring have longer necks.

Some biopoliticians (Thorson and Cauthen) draw on Lamarck’s “perfection-seeking” principle in their own concepts.

Nevertheless, the theory of evolutionbased on natural selection, as suggested by Charles Darwin, is of more interest from the biopolitical perspective. A modified updated version of Darwin’s theory, known as neo-Darwinism, is at the core of a large number of recent biopolitical studies. Darwinismis characterized by overt sociomorphism. This means that Darwinism regarded biological systemsas analogs of humansociety. The central tenet of Darwin’s theory that “the fittest” survive during “the struggle for existence” was related to earlier ideas suggested by the political economist Thomas Malthuys. Malthuys, in his treatise called “An Essay on the Principle of Population,” first published in 1798, emphasized the struggle for limited resourcesin human society that was caused by populationgrowthand could be slowed down by epidemics, wars, or birth controlmeasures. Subsequently (in the late 19th and early 20th century), sociomorphism was widely used in the life sciences. For instance, ecologyand, still later, sociobiology, imported a large number of concepts and notions from economicsand other social sciences.

Darwin paid attention to the complex social organizationof ants, bees, and wasps. Complex insect societies that bear some similarity to humansocial (political) systems still receive attention in works in the field of sociobiology or biopolitics per se (see, e.g., Wilson, 1975; Arnhart, 1994; Corning, 1983, 2003a).

In the late 19th century, Herbert Spencer asserted that, in organizational terms, the complex societies of higher animals were the direct precursors of humansociety. Sumner and Ward also made their contributions to comparative studies of human political life and its animal analogs.

Political systems were also compared to living organisms by Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and Emile Durkheim, reviving medieval comparisons of the same kind. Woodrow Wilson, a political scientist and the Presidentof the USAat the beginning of the 20th century, claimed that the government “is not a machine, but a living thing. It conforms not to the theory of the Universe, but to the theory of organic life. It follows not Newton’s laws, but Darwin’s laws” (quoted from: Somit, 1972, p. 10). The 1908 address of the President of the American Political Science Association, A.L. Laswell, was entitled The Physiology of Politics.

At the turn of the 20th century, the Russian scholar and revolutionary Peter A. Kropotkin put forward his own theory of evolution. In contrast to Darwin, he emphasized cooperationand not competitionas the main driving forceof biological evolution. Kropotkin, in 1902 (see edition: Kropotkin, 1972), also applied this idea to the evolution of humansociety. He preached a new type of social organization based on voluntary work, anarchism, and complex interactionsamong “diverse groups and federations of all sizes and ranks.” This concept was corroborated by facts concerning animals that are capable of “unconscious mutual aid.”

Disciples of a famous scientist often take his ideas to extremes. This happened to Darwin’s ideas. Some of his followers straightforwardly explained humansocial behavioron the basis of the natural selectiontheory. This attitude was particularly characteristic of Social Darwinism, whichactually promoted racismand eugenics. At the practical level, the eugenic movement aimed to create favorable conditions for individualspossessing socially valuable hereditary traits(e.g., talents) and to prevent those possessing negative hereditary traits, including colored people in America, from reproduction. In accordance with these views, Madison Grant called for a “decision of Congressof the United Statesto adopt discriminatory and restrictive measures against the immigrationof undesirable people and races” (Grant, 1923, p. xxviii; quoted from: Somit & Peterson, 2011, p. 4). Eugenics was founded by Francis Galton in 1883. He was Darwin’s cousin, who studied pedigrees of talented people in an attempt to prove the heritabilityof their talents.

Theory of evolutionwas used to justify harsh competition, the “might-is-right” principle, and warfare. Social Darwinists regarded Homo sapiens as an ordinary representative of the animal kingdom. For example, they claimed that humans, like other animals, were predisposed to shed bloodof their conspecifics. The obvious shortcomings of Social Darwinismdiscouraged a large number of scholars in the early 20th centuryfrom drawingany comparisons between humansocietyand animal groups and communities. Our specieswas regarded as unique. Humankind was not considered part of the Earth’s bio-diversity.

However, the evolution-molded features of humanbeings (in behavioral and psychological terms) were re-emphasized in the 1960s and 1970s. This was due to the development of ethology, ecology, neurology, genetics, and biopolitics per se.

1.3.1.6. Sociocultural Paradigm in Biology

In the second half the 20th century, some biologists accentuated the similarity, relatedness, or comparability of humans and other life forms, of humansocietyand animal communities(biosocial systems). Biology was enriched with concepts borrowed from the humanities and social sciencesand, vice versa, biological concepts found their way into these areas.

Recently, this new trend has been supported even by some microbiologists. Although dealing with invisible and seemingly primitive organisms, they are presently using terms like “bacterial behavior,” “microbial sociality,” or even “bacterial altruism,” which are no longer perceived as irrelevant.

A number of primatologists tend to think that there was no break in continuity in the evolutionof monkeys, apes, and humans, particularly with respect to behavior. Certain precursors of moral norms and social rulesare likely to exist in ape/monkey groups (Goodall, 1994; de Waal, 1996b, 1997, 2001, 2006).

The new developing sociocultural paradigm in biology is currently gaining in importance. It influences, apart from the life sciencesper se, the humanities and social sciences, changing the dominant attitudesto humannature, society, and culture. The idea that humans are unique in many important respects still stands unchallenged. Nonetheless, some of the apparently “specifically human” features, including cognitive capacities, the sense of beauty, and the sense of justice, are presumably based on archaic behavioral traitsshared with those of the higher animals. For example, recent comparative research on cognitionin animals and humans has provided the foundationsfor the new interdisciplinary research area termed evolutionary epistemology(pioneered by K. Lorenz, D. Campbell, H. Vollmer, and others). This field focuses on cognitive capacities with emphasis upon their development in the course of biological evolution(see Shul’ga, 2011).

The biobehavioral/ethological subfield of biopolitics deals with concepts of evolutionary biology for improving “the understanding of the political behavior of humans” (Somit and Peterson, 1998, p. 555). The subfield concentrates on the impact of the archaic behavioral repertoire on political processes and events. This subfield lies at the core of biopolitics as interpreted by the APLS. In fact, the influence of genetic and neurological factors on politics, the subject of two other areas of biopolitics, is exerted via their impact on behavior. The subfield of biopolitics is based upon the knowledge supplied by the “biobehavioral” sciences including, in the first place, ethology(particularly social ethology), sociobiology, and evolutionary psychology. It is closely linked to evolutiontheory.

Ethology originally “emphasized observation of animals in their natural habitats. Through direct observation, ethologists seek to identify rules of behavior vital to the survivaland reproductive success of the speciesunder study. Of particular interest in biopolitical terms is the distinction between ultimate and proximate causes of behavior. If we are interested in the physiological mechanismsthat carry out behavior, involving the animal’s sense organsand the nervous system, then we deal with its proximate mechanisms. For instance, we can measure hormone levels or record impulseson nervous cells during the behavior under study (e.g., aggressionof a vervet monkey male directed at a conspecific). However, we can address the question how a particular kind of behavior developed in evolution, why it was selected, and what its adaptive value was, i.e., what advantages had the animal as a result of acquiring the behavior. The second question relates to the ultimate causes of the behavior. They can be elucidated by, e.g., investigating the behavior’s influence on survivalor reproductive success (i.e., number of offspring).

Social behavior in the animal kingdom can be defined as the whole spectrum of behavioral interactions among individualsbelonging to the same local group/community(Deryagina and Butovskaya, 1992, 2004). The social behaviorof diverse biological speciesis based upon unitary, evolutionarily conserved principlescoexisting with species-specific features. In particular, the uniqueness of humansociality is indisputable, although ethologists extend their concepts and methods to human society. However,“… human sociality is distinctively human in the extremely high degree of complexityto which it has evolved in our lineage” (Rosenberg, 2009, p. 32).

Despite the important differences, social behaviorin both animals and humans is classified into (a) agonistic behavior involving conflicts between individualsor groups (see Dewsbury, 1981) and (b) loyal behavior including the totality of friendly interactions among living beings that consolidate their groups, families, colonies, or other biosocial systems.

Since biopolitics is the main subject of this work, we give special attention to the application of the ethological approach to humans, i.e., to humanethology. It is assumed that “evolutionary theory after all is the basic theory of all manifestations of life and basic, therefore, for any understanding of human behavior, including those facets of human behavior which are the subjects of the various humanities” (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1997, p. 13). The Institute for Human Ethology was founded by Eibl-Eibesfeldt in Munich in 1970, and this, roughly, could be considered the date of human ethology’s birth. Human ethologists also established the International Society for Human Ethology (1972).

Human ethologists often study everyday behavior, and Eibl-Eibesfeldt’s associate Hans Haas “developed for this purpose an unobtrusive method of filming, using a mirror lense which afforded a view at an angle of 90° to axis of the camera” (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1997, p. 14). A goal of this ethological research is to reveal the humanspecies-specific ethogram (also called biogrammar), i.e., human behaviors that exist regardless of culture, period, and the individual peculiarities of the humans involved. Human ethologists emphasize behaviorsmore universal than the species-specific ethogram, i.e., identical or comparable in humans and higher animals (e.g., primates).

Human ethologists, therefore, conduct cross-cultural studies: they compare different cultures in behavioral terms, concentrating on identical/similar behavior patterns and whole repertories that are referred to as behavioral universals such as the smile that is common to Bushmen, Papuans, and Europeans.

Other universal expressive motor patterns include, e.g., the eyebrow flash, an involuntary behavior pattern displayed when encountering a new individual. It is characteristic of people, irrespective of their culture. However, the eyebrow flash is considered inappropriate in Japan. Therefore, the Japanese are taught to suppress it (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975). The eyebrow flash is not displayed by schizophrenics whose ethogram is changed by their mental disorder. This example demonstrates how the ethological approach can be used in psychiatryto make a diagnosis (Samokhvalov et al., 2002).

Glendon Schubert (1981) described, in a humorous manner, an attempt of American biopoliticians to investigate decision-making by the judges of the Federal Tribunal of Switzerlandfrom the ethological perspective. The Americans with their VCRs were requested to leave the courtroom some two minutes after starting their observations (Schubert, 1981).

Social technologies are practiced by politicians that deliberately or spontaneously use ethological lawsand the humanethogram for, e.g., gaining and maintaining a high social/political status. In this situation, impressive dominancecues(elevated body posture, raised head) in conjunction with loyal behavior-related messages(e.g., an appeasing smile) that stimulate the subcortical structures of the brainare used both by chimpanzees and humans.

Communication between living organisms is usually construed in the literature as information exchangebetween individualsand/or their groups. It is an essential component of any kind of social behaviorbecause it is hard to imagine social behavior without information exchange. It is similarly difficult to conceive of an information transmissionsystem that would not be social. For example, individuals in a chimpanzeegroup communicate to one another information concerning new objects (are they fooditems, enemies, or neutralobjects?), the distance between the objects and themselves, and the objects’ number (Deryagina and Butovskaya, 2004).

Communication is characteristic of various vertebrate and invertebrate animals. It is often interpreted as follows: “If an animal performs an action that changes another individual’s behavior, this can be called communication” (Reznikova, 2004). In the literature, the term “communication’ is also used with respect to plants, fungi, and microorganisms, as well as cells and tissues inside an animal/plant organism. For example, nervous cells in an animal organism exchange signalsknown as neurotransmitters(neuromediators) and so do cells inside a plant organism that behave in a neuronal-like fashion. Microorganisms such as bacteriaengage in quorum-sensingcommunication, i.e., they change their activities in responseto receiving a signal, termed the quorum-sensing pheromone, or autoinducer, from other cells (Shpakov, 2009).

Irrespective of the kind of the biosystem involved, communication can be described in terms of a modified Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver (SMCR) model, originally suggested by David Berlo (1960), who expanded on the earlier linear modelof communication (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). Communication includes the following (Fig. 2.1):

• Sender

• Message

• Channel (or medium)

• Receiver

• Code

During communication, the sender and the receiver can repeatedly swap their roles and even perform these two roles simultaneously—in terms of Barnlund’s (2008) transactional model of communication. Communication is, therefore, bilateral, even if it is called “communication with multiple or indefinite receivers.” For instance, the mediadistribute information to all citizens of a country, and each of them can, at least theoretically, send his/her responseto a TV studio or a media center; in the biological realm, there are similar messagesaddressed to nobody in particular. They are characteristic of anonymous groups of some birds, reptiles, fish, and invertebrates.

Communication between individualsinvolves several evolutionarily conserved channels:

• Communication based on direct contact between living organisms (between cells if the organisms involved are unicellular)[2]. In animals, this communication channel is termed the tactile channel. In particular, primates actively communicate by touching, hugging, kissing, and grooming one another (de Waal, 1996b, 1997, 2001, 2006; Deryagina & Butovskaya, 2004).

• Distant communication involving chemical signals. This channel plays a major part in both micro- and macroorganisms. In animals, exchanging chemical signals is referred to as olfactory communication. Animals mark their home ranges with odorous substances. They use their sense of smell to distinguish their own offspring from other young individualsand determine an individual’s social status, rank, and physiological stateincluding, e.g., readiness to copulate. The role of olfactory communication in primates, especially in apes, is limited by the operation of the visual and acoustic communication channels. Nevertheless, olfactory communication is of indisputable importance even in humans. It is involved in male-female relationships and, in all likelihood, in the interactions between a leader and his subordinates.

• Visual communication is particularly important in animals with advanced nervous systems, such as squids and other cephalopod molluscs, birds, and mammalsincluding primates. Chimpanzees display, e.g., visual signalsassociated with friendly behavior, exemplified by the play face (Gaspar, 2006). The evolutionary development of facial expressions and gesturesin apes is of considerable interest in terms of speechdevelopment, because these nonverbal cuesprobably evolved in conjunction with verbal communication during humanevolution.

• Distant communication by means of sounds (the acoustic channel). Using sounds, animals signal danger(e.g., birdsproduce the alarm call), regulate male-female relationships, and make it possible for individualsto “keep in touch.” For instance, if a young mammalis alone, it keeps producing a special call until located by the parent. Communication with sound waves is apparently not limited to the higher animals. A bacterial culturetreated with a lethal dose of an antibioticsends a message that stimulates the growthof another culture that is separated by a glass partition(Nikolaev, 1992; Matsuhashi et al., 1996). Presumably, the message is transmitted by ultrasoundwaves. In vervet monkeys, sound signalsdenoting a leopard, a snake, and an eagle were detected (see Gaspar, 2006). Sound signals perform important functions in ape communication, and this primitive “protolanguage” has not been deciphered yet. There is evidencethat chimpanzees can produce analogs of some humansounds (such as vowels). Nevertheless, the structureof the throat and the braincortexin nonhuman apes apparently prevents them from using human verbal language. However, they memorize and adequately use hundreds of words in Amslan, the language of deaf people in the U.S., and they can also communicate messagesby means of computerlexicograms.

All these communication channels are sufficiently important in terms of humansocietyand politics.

Although the main focus of this book is upon biopolitics, it has already been pointed out that the bio-humanities (see 1.1.3) also include a number of other fields. One of them is biosemiotics, which can be defined as an interdisciplinary field of theoretical and empirical research that deals with communication and signification in living systems (Hoffmeyer, 1997). Biosemiotics is at the interfaceof biology and semiotics that is concerned with sign systems including humanlanguages, nonverbal signals, artificial means of communication, and various cultural artifacts.

It follows from the above that communication in biosystems involves information-transmitting signs/signals. A sign, whether excrement pile on the boundary of the territorybelonging to a badger, or a red circle with the word STOP on a road, has a meaning, i.e., it denotes something different from itself. A sign has three elements: (1) the sign carrier (the object endowed with a meaning); (2) the meaning of the sign; and (3) the interpreter that understands the sign’s meaning. As for the road sign mentioned above, the red circle with the word STOP is the sign carrier, the prohibition to use the road is the meaning, and a driver or a traffic police officer is the interpreter (Fig. 2.3).

The central idea of biosemiotics is that signsare produced and interpreted not only by humanbeings, but also by all other forms of life; moreover, the capacity to generate and use signs and meanings is considered a distinctive feature of living systems. For instance, dominanceand territorialclaims are signaled using specific cuesthat are partly universal as far as primates are concerned.

Biosystems communicate using analogs of

• Texts composed of strings of letters, such as the DNAcode;

• Hieroglyphs exemplified by small-size signal moleculesincluding hormonesand neurotransmitters; each signal conveys a complete message, like a Chinese hieroglyph that may represent a complete word;

• Cultural artifacts such as sculptures and architectural ensembles. The surface of a living cell has sophisticated patterns, protrusions, indentations, and other “architectural details” that enable other cells to identify its functional type (Sedov, 2009).

The indisputable political importance of humancommunication including its archaic, evolutionarily conserved elements provides for a close relationship between biopolitics and biosemiotics.

The term “agonistic behavior” comprises all conflict-related forms of social behaviorand includes (a) aggression and relevant signalsaccompanying aggression or preceding it, i.e., aggressive/threatening displays; (b) conciliatory (buffer) behavior; and (c) avoidance/ isolation. In other words, a conflict between individualsmay result in (a) physical violenceand, in humansociety, also verbal aggressive behavior; (b) reconciliationthat is attained by establishing either hierarchical or horizontal relations between former opponents; or (c) avoidance behaviorand isolation of the opponents from each other.

Agonistic behavior was investigated in classical studies with mammals, birds, fish, and invertebrates, conducted by Lorenz, Tinbergen, Frisch, and other prominent ethologists. The notion of “agonistic behavior” can be extrapolated from animal speciesto Homo sapiens and used in terms of political behavior. Interestingly, analogs of agonistic behavior were detected in microorganisms. If two microbial cultures contact, they start producing elevated amounts of antibiotics. These chemical substances destroy competitors, stop their growthor inactivate them in a more subtle way. Allelopathy in plants, i.e., the production of substances that are toxic for other plants, can also be considered as an analog of animal agonistic behavior.

Unfortunately, agonistic relationships are inevitable in humansociety. Moreover, wars, conflicts, riots, and coups used to be major political issuesin diverse countries and various historical periods. Even relatively peaceful historical periods are marked by constant disagreements between different states, strife between political partiesand pressure groups, and conflicts between different branches of the government as well as between political leadersor activists.

Aggression is the most important form of agonistic interactions in both ethological and political terms. Lorenz, Krushinsky, Leuhausen, and others have conducted detailed studies on various forms of aggressionwith special attention to its driving forces. “Research on aggression has been a ‘hot topic’ in scientific investigationsfor more than five decades as it has been a targetfor many specialistsfrom different disciplines, ranging from anthropology, behavioral biologyto psychology, genetics, social sciences, neurosciences and zoology” (Francesco Ferrari et. al., 2005, p. 260). Research on aggression is of special interest in biopolitical terms because it is closely related to the socially and politically important concept of violence that “comprises a subset of injuriesassociated with the use of forceand broadly encompasses assault, homicide, self-inflicted injuryand suicide” (Mawson, 1999).

A classical ethological definition of aggressiongiven by Tinbergen (1968) is “approaching an opponent and inflicting damage on him or at least generating stimuli that cause him to submit.” With respect to humans, the social psychologistMyers (2010) emphasized, in a similar fashion, that aggression is physical or verbal behavior aimed at causing damage. In humansociety, an important subtype is relational aggression, i.e., “intentional harming others via manipulationof social relationships” (spreading rumors, gossip, social exclusion, see Reed et al., 2008).

Human aggressionundoubtedly has important unique features, due to the uniqueness of the humanspeciesin general. The ability to act with injurious intent is one of these features. Nevertheless, human beings and their aggressive behaviorare under the indisputable influence of evolutionary factors. To this extent, it can be considered a specific variation on the biobehavioral theme of aggression in its ethological meaning. Ethologists use the term “aggression” with respect to various vertebrates, invertebratesas well as plants, fungi, or microorganisms.

Aggression is a heterogeneous phenomenon in terms of motivationand function, including a wide variety of forms and subtypes. Takahashi et al. (2011, p. 184) emphasize that aggressive “behaviorsoccur in the context of competing for foodand other resourcesthat are important to an individual’s survivaland reproduction(resident-intruder aggression), defense of a territoryor offspring (territorialand maternal aggression), or in responseto fear or frustration.” Other scholars or scientists distinguish intermale (or, alternatively, interfemale), predatory, maternal (paternal), instrumental, sexual, fear-induced, and aversive stimulus-caused aggression. It is also possible to single out typical situations in which aggression is likely to break out, including interactions involving dominance; protectionof infantsby adults; killing and eating animals of other species; a painful injury; crowding of relatively unfamiliar animals competing for highly valued resources, etc. (reviewed, van der Dennen, 2011, p. 58). Different aggression types often involve different neural mechanisms and depend on different genes.

It should be re-emphasized that one should discriminate between (i) the ultimate level that deals with the evolution-molded behavioral tendencies and (ii) the proximate level comprising immediate physiological and psychological mechanisms that trigger aggressive behavior.

On the ultimate level, aggressive behaviorcan be analyzed in terms of functions performed by it for hundreds of millions of years of biological evolution. The following is a brief discussion of aggressionroles in terms of these typical functions.

1) Survival-oriented a ggressionthat is carried out by an individual for the purpose of (i) protecting the individual’s life (defensive aggression) or (ii) obtaining resources(competitive aggression). In terms of ultimate causation, both aggression types cope with the problem of securing an individual’s survival. However, the difference between them is that competitive aggression is generally characterized by “ritualized” attacks as animals are usually restrained in using lethal weaponsat their disposal; this limits the likelihood of causing serious injuriesto their rivals (Lorenz, 1966). Territorial aggression aimed at capturing a certain area and defending it from rivals can be regarded as a subtype of competitive aggression. Some ethologists consider a predator’s attack food-seeking/nutritive behavior and not aggression. Lorenz only admitted that the term aggression applies to the prey’s counterattack. This is exemplified by a gaggle of geese that can attack (mob) a fox.

2) Reproduction-related aggression involved in mating behavior and parent-offspring interactions. Special emphasis should be placed upon male-male aggression that is to a considerable extent ritualized, similar to competitive aggression aimed at obtaining individual resources. It is exemplified by black-cock mating displays and other contests related to competitionfor females (interfemale aggression is also possible). The prowess of each of potential opponents may be estimated from their traitsthat perform a symbolic function. They demonstrate their strength and courage and make other males surrender. This is exemplified by the size of rooster crests: the bigger the size the higher the social status. Lorenz (1966) considered men’s outfits a result of the selection pressure exerted by women. Intergeneration relationships may also involve aggression in animals. Female house micebecome highly aggressive while engaging in parental care, and this is maternal or post-partum aggression (Francesco Ferrari et al., 2005). As ethologists emphasize, aggressive displays may form part of more complex rituals involved, e.g., in mating behavior exemplified by courtshipin pigeons. In coral fish, only male courtship is compatible with aggression; female mating behavior cannot be carried out if the female fish is aggressive. This is an example of the incompatible behavior motivation law that applies to a variety of other speciesand can be to some extent extrapolated to Homo sapiens.

3) Aggression stabilizing an individual’s social status. Aggressive behavior is frequently involved in establishing dominance-submission hierarchies, even though dominance may be attained without aggression. In an established hierarchy, aggressive or threatening behaviorprevents individualsfrom violating social norms, e.g., disregarding social ranks. This is called disciplinary aggression. Apart from humansociety, it occurs in nonhuman primatespeciesincluding the chimpanzee(de Waal, 1996b). Aggressive father-child interactions in the context of play behavior—rough-and-tumble play (RTP)—decrease child aggression toward peers provided that the father plays the dominant role (Flanders et al., 2010). In ape groups, disciplinary aggression prevents actions that could be termed “illegal” if performed in human society. For example, it is used to discipline a male attempting to attack a female or an infant. This punitive behavior is also called moralistic aggression. It has been suggested that such aggression is related to the evolutionary rootsof human ethicsand even law (Gruter, 1991; McGuire, 1992; de Waal, 1996b).

4) Aggression involved in securing the existence of the whole biosocial system despite threatsposed by outgroup individuals. Loyal behavior within a social groupis enhanced by intergroup hostility(Lorenz, 1966), i.e., by ingroup-outgroup discriminationthat, in lightof available data, seems to occur in most kinds of living beings ranging from unicellular creatures to mammalsincluding primates. Aggression towards other humangroups (aliens) is one of the focal points of present-day biopolitical research. Our close evolutionary relativeschimpanzees, as well as other primates, engage in collective intergroup fighting. One of the goals is obtaining foodconcentrated, e.g., in the form of garbageby humans. The modern human species, Homo sapiens, represents a single, genetically homogeneous species, but the subpopulations (nations, races, etc.) of this species are markedly different in terms of cultural traditions. During wars or conflicts, people belonging to other cultures are treated almost as if they were representatives of other species (cultural pseudospeciation, Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1998). Outsiders (“aliens”) are dehumanized, i.e., excluded from the human species (Homo sapiens). This may result in quasi-predatory behavior carried out during wars or ethnic conflicts. Such behavior lacks restrictionsthat are typical of most intraspecies interactions. Likewise, in often fierce intergroup aggressive encounters in chimpanzees, individuals of other chimpanzeegroups are “dechimpized” (van der Dennen, 2011) and treated like common prey, such as colobus monkeys hunted and eaten by chimpanzees. Aggression between members of the same group is often mitigated by conciliatory behavior, particularly in apes (see the end of this subsection). But, as emphasized by Adang (1999a), “there is no—never—reconciliationafter episodes of intergroup violencein chimpanzees” (quoted in: van der Dennen, 2011, p. 62). The severity of conflicts between groups (compared to intragroup clashes) is also characteristic of humans and has relevanceto ethnic conflicts.

While the above classificationdeals with ultimate causes of aggression, it can also be classified in a different way, based on its proximate mechanisms. The issue is what factors cause a humanor an animal to behave aggressively. In these terms, aggressive behaviorcan be subdivided into (Hinde, 1992; Myers, 2010):

• Impulsive (hostile, injurious) aggression. This aggression may break out spontaneously. However, it is often instigated by an attack, a threat, or a stimulusincluding heat, overcrowding, and other stressfactors. In humansociety, such aggression may be caused by an insult. To a certain extent, aversive aggression may be regarded as self-rewarding behavior, “aggression for aggression’s sake,” exemplified by the behavior of sadists or maniacs. Male chimpanzees form “killing parties” attacking other chimpanzeegroups. They seem to enjoy their raids. “The chimpanzees express their anticipatory excitement behaviorally and physiologically, and during the actual acts of killing they emit pleasurable vocalizationsand postural displays that may have parallels in human psychopathology” (Francesco Ferrari et al., 2005, p. 261). A subtype of impulsiveaggression, aversive aggression, usually involves severe stressoften accompanied by angerand rage. In a human, stress induced by frustration, annoyance, or provocation results in arousal(Zillman, 1983) and often anger (Berkowitz, 1962), but this emotional statedoes not necessarily cause aggression (Bandura, 1973). In terms of the stimulation-induced behavioral inhibitiontheory (Mawson, 1999), stress- (frustration-)related arousal causes the individual involved to seek sensory stimulation associated with intense perceptions and colorful stimuli. Sensory stimulation can be attained in different ways: eating spicy food, having sex, or establishing new friendly relationships. Physical violenceis just one of the possible strategies of attaining sensory stimulation (Mawson, 1999).

• Instrumental aggression, i.e., aggression aimed at obtaining an object such as a fooditem or a toy in a kindergarten. It is to a lesser extent accompanied by emotional stressor even associated with positive emotions. In biosocial systems (groups, herds, flocks) of animals, such aggression is often ritualized and ordinarily non-lethal. Most male deer do not strike their opponents with deadly horns while fighting for females. However, if the aggressor meets with strong resistance, aggression may change from instrumental to aversive, resulting in characteristic stress. R. Hinde (1992) singled out status-seeking adolescent aggression. Social status and prestigeas well as leadershipin a social groupare specific resourcesthat are directly or indirectly related to reproduction. In fact, dominanceand leadership attract the attention of representatives of the opposite sexand, therefore, promote reproductive success. Revelers in British night cafes or pubs that are notorious for their aggressive behaviortypically prefer aggression to flightonly if this is necessary for them to retain their social status—to “save face” in the eyes of other young people, particularly girlfriends (McNally, 2004).

In his bestseller, Aggression, Lorenz (1966) considered humanand animal aggressionfrom a unitary perspective in terms of his “hydraulic theory” of aggression. Lorenz admitted that external stimuli can trigger off aggressive behaviorbut believed that aggression is ultimately based upon an innate drive. He compared aggressivenessto an incompressible liquid that gradually accumulates in an animal’s organism; therefore, the term “hydraulic theory.” The pressure of the “liquid” gradually increases if there is no outlet, i.e., no chance to engage in aggressive behavior. An individual starts to display attacking behavior towards inappropriate or even imaginary objects. A caged starling attacked nonexistent flies in the air (Lorenz, 1966).

It is currently accepted that Lorenz’s “hydraulic theory” has serious limitations. Empirical studies did not confirm the catharsishypothesisthat seems to follow from this theory. The catharsis hypothesis predicted that aggressive episodes in movies would decrease the aggressivenessof people watching them because the “aggressionliquid” is released and its pressure is decreased while taking in the aggression shown on the screen. Conversely, evidencewas presented that childrenand teenagers increase their aggression after watching violent TV programs, also in combination with pornographic scenes (Myers, 2010). In the literature, status-related competitionis considered one of the main incentives for aggression. “Rather than conceiving aggressiveness as a trait, it is more properly seen as a byproduct of dominance-striving among males (Nicholson, 1997, p. 1071).

The social learning theory suggested by Albert Bandura (1973) as well as its modification, the social cognition theory (Eron, 1994) place emphasis on instrumental aggression. In human society, a young individual learns to behave aggressively. Aggressive behavior is encouraged by useful results of aggression, including trophies taken from the loser, elevated social status, and sexual/reproductive success. It is inhibited by sanctions imposed on the aggressor (Bandura, 1973; Eron, 1994; Myers, 2010). Even frustration-induced aversive aggression gradually converts into reward-dependent, i.e., instrumental, aggression. The issue concerning the ratio between aversive and instrumental aggression in humans and animals awaits further sociological and ethological research. It has significant biopolitical implications that are linked to the political consequences of aggression manifesting themselves during wars, terror acts, or ethnic conflicts.

Even though psychologists and sociologists tend to explain human aggression mainly in terms of social/cultural factors, aggression can also be considered from a biobehavioral perspective, as the following points indicate:

· Aggressive facial expressions, gestures, or postures have common features in human and nonhuman primates (and, in some cases, even other groups of mammals). These pre-existing behavior patterns are creatively combined and integrated into a coherent behavior style, like a jigsaw puzzle, during a child’s development, which is heavily influenced by experience including social learning.

· The importance of evolutionary roots of human aggression is highlighted by the fact that it is age-dependent. Aggressive behavior is characteristic of young individuals both in human society and in a group of monkeys or apes. Most hooligans among football fans are 15 to 25 years old (Adang, 1999). In general, human males are statistically more aggressive than females. The aggression level in males is correlated with the concentrations of testosterone (Myers, 2010), the male sexual hormone, as well as of the stress hormones epinephrine (adrenalin) and norepinephrine (noradrenalin).

Hence, in order to understand human aggression, we should pay sufficient attention to both biobehavioral (evolutionary) driving forces and relevant social/cultural factors.

Aggressive/agonistic displays are signals that precede or accompany aggressive behavior. In diverse animal species including coral fish investigated by Lorenz, a complex sequence of increasingly intense aggressive signals is displayed before the outbreak of aggression as such. Thus, the parties involved in conflict have a chance to avoid inflicting damage on each other. A conflict in human society usually undergoes a number of escalation stages before it reaches its culmitation, i.e., the all-out aggression stage. Before an armed conflict between two states breaks out, the potential enemies are expected to exchange messages followed by an ultimatum. Even after the aggression outbreak, messages communicated between opponents may stop or at least mitigate it (conciliatory behavior).

Recently, much research has been conducted on reconciliation in animals that often involves aggression-buffering behavior (Deryagina and Butovskaya, 1992, 2004) revealed in variety of mammal species. For instance, a wolf losing a fight lies on its back, and this posture usually signals submission. Complex conciliatory rituals are characteristic of primates. Reconciliation was initially revealed in captive chimpanzees (de Waal and van Roosmalen, 1979). It was defined as “as a form of affiliative interaction between former opponents which interact affinitively shortly after an agonistic event” (quoted according to: Palagi et al., 2005, p.280). Subsequently, various forms of reconciliation were documented in about 30 primate species including lemurs. Such aggression buffers include touching the opponent with fingers or lips, assuming the copulation posture, inviting him/her to play, kissing, and moving various objects. In field studies with brown capuchin monkeys, “reconciliation was more likely to occur between opponents that supported each other more frequently and that spent more timew together (van der Dennen, 2011, p.61-62). In this situation, agonistic interactions seem to be overridden by pre-existing loyal relationships that are discussed in more detail in the following subsection (2.1.4).

Aggression-inhibiting conciliatory behavior may be initiated by the aggression victim, the aggressor (aggression autoinhibition), or third parties particularly if they are high-ranking individuals, such as the leader of a primate group. Aggression autoinhibition is of particular importance for socially living primates. Individuals in their groups “must learn not only to recognize social cues of aggression but also to restrain and control their own impulses whenever necessary. In fact, achieving high dominance staus within a troop may depends on inhibiting aggression as much as on expressing it” (Higley, 2003, quotation from: van der Dennen, 2011, p.59-60).

Complex and effective aggression buffers are typical of our closest evolutionary relatives, i.e. the chimpanzee and the bonobo. The functions of conciliatory behavior include relationship repair, benefits associated with friendly bonds with important individuals, a decreased probability of future conflict, and stress mitigation in the victim and possibly other individuals involved (Palago et al., 2005).

Individuals with equal social ranks may engage in conciliatory behavior to inhibit aggressive drives. Alternatively, reconciliation may be initiated by a low-ranking individual attempting to pacify the higher-ranking aggressor by displaying submissive behavior. In primitive human societies, a similar function was performed by group/tribe leaders exemplified by “leopard skin-wearing leaders” in Africa.

Isolation (avoidance behavior) is a subtype of conflict-related behavior that does not directly involve aggression and can often be considered a peaceful alternative to it. Isolation implies avoiding the potential opponent. In the animal kingdom, it often results in marking the boundaries of one’s own territory. This makes it possible to establish relatively peaceful relations with former opponents, as long as the boundaries are acknowledged by the parties involved. Good fences make good friends.

Avoidance behavior is characteristic of a wide variety of biological species, occurring both on the individual and the group level. For instance, two groups of animals of the same species avoid each other, and their isolation is a prerequisite for the consolidation of each of these groups. Even microbial colonies growing on one petri dish do not merge (Budrene, 1985; Novikova, 1989). An insect society cannot exist without separating from other societies. (Zakharov, 1991).

Territorial behavior occurs in primates. However, it is not characteristic of some primate species such as rhesus monkeys, langurs, baboons, and our closest evolutionary relatives chimpanzees and gorillas that defend not individual but group territories (Deryagina and Butovskaya, 2004).

Isolation takes a large number of different forms in human society. People are isolated from one another in their caves, apartments, or palaces. They draw national, regional, or other boundaries and divide spheres of influence, competence fields, and levels of political structures.

Modern humans have individual territories subdivided into (a) the social zone (~92 centimeters in Australia: Pease, 1992) characteristic of communication between people who are not close friends; (b) the friendly communication zone that is accessible to sufficiently close friends; (c) the intimate zone related to intimate relationships; and (d) the superintimate zone that cannot be enter

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