The turbulent US relationship with Russia

The relationship between Russia and the United States under the Bush administration had a very difficult start. Just weeks after Bush took office, the United States expelled more than 50 Russian diplomats on charges of espionage. Moscow responded by expelling an equal number of US diplomats. Such issues as the further expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty also fueled tensions.

Gradually, though, the relationship seemed to improve. Moscow's reaction to the September 2001 terrorist attacks appeared to create an opportunity for improvement. Not only did the Russian president denounce the attacks, but he gave the United States substantive assistance in a variety of ways. Most crucially, Russia made it clear to the governments of the Central Asian republics that it did not object to a temporary US military presence in the region to wage the war in Afghanistan. Without Russia's approval, the United States would have found it far more difficult to gain the cooperation of those governments.

Russia helped the United States in other ways. For example, Moscow resisted the demand of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to cut its oil output to prevent a fall of global oil prices. As the world's second-largest oil producer, Russia had a crucial role to plav. Instead of responding favorably to OPEC's requests, Moscow maintained production at high levels — a position favored by the United States.

How did the US administration reward Russia for its cooperation? One of the administration's first initiatives was to announce America's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which Moscow had long regarded as the centerpiece of its relationship with the United States on arms-control issues.

As if the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty weren't enough, US officials let it be known that the United States intended to maintain a long-term military presence in the Central Asian republics. This was a classic deceit, and Russian officials made it clear that they were nothappy about Washington's action. Russia clearly prefers a close, cooperative relationship with the United States and is not willing to close the door on that possibility.

But if Washington continues to take unfair advantage, Russia can and probably will pursue other options. Serious long-term damage will occur if the Russian people begin to see the United States as a hostile power that always attempts to take advantage of their country.

The third side of the strategic triangle

Cooperation between Russia and China has been building for several years. The bitter rivalry between Moscow and Beijing eased rapidly with the end of the Cold War, and by the mid-1990s China had become Russia's largest arms customer. By 1996, the leaders of the two countries were describing their relationship as a " strategic partnership," and it became routine for Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) to issue joint statements criticizing US policy on such issues as NATO expansion, the US-led military intervention in the Balkans, and the development of ballistic-missile defenses.

That cooperation has deepened on several levels. Politically, it is symbolized by the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO, whose membership consists of Russia, China, and four Central Asian countries, has as its primary focus combating Islamic extremism. But an important secondary motive — as various SCO statements and communiques make clear — is to contain America's increasingly dominant position in Asia.

Russia and China clearly wish to avoid a confrontational relationship with the United States, if that is possible. Russia has been supporting most aspects of the US war against terrorism, responding mildly to US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and even indicating that a second round of NATO expansion will not prove fatal to US-Russian relations. China, too, has sought to minimize frictions. Both Russia and China regard their economic links to the US-led West as vital.

The triangular relationship involving Russia, China and the United States is critically important. If the strategic triangle is managed properly, the danger of a great-power war in the coming decades will be virtually eliminated. If managed improperly, the 21st century could proceed down the same violent path as the 20th century. Much will depend on the wisdom of US policy.

2. Give Russian equivalents of the following words and phrases. To wage a war; to eliminate; controversy; to be of critical (great) importance; to stand out; to deepen cooperation; NATO expansion; to denounce smth; to ease tensions; on charges of espionage; restraint; bring relations to the crisis point; withdrawal from; to preserve and expand economic relations; to expel; to contain; an ally; deterrent; rival; rapprochement; to take office; to play a crucial role; a long-term military presence; vital; to fuel tension; to combat extremism; decade. 3. Give English equivalents of the following words and phrases. Reproduce the sentences from the article with them. Долгосрочное военное присутствие; быть исключительно важным; прийти к власти; вести войну; по обвинению в шпионаже; союзник; ослабить напряженность; выделяться; поставить отношения на грань кризиса; обман; выход из договора; углубить сотрудничество; расши­рение НАТО; десятилетие; сближение; играть ключевую роль; выдво­рять из страны; сохранить и расширить экономические связи; осу­дить что-либо; сдерживать; средство устрашения; жизненно важный; уничтожить; разногласие; сдержанность; усилить напряженность; ослабить напряженность.

­1. Read the article and look up the meaning of the underlined words and phrases in the dictionary.

A second-generation alliance system

WASHINGTON — During the Cold War and in the decade after its end, the United States based its global strategy on an alliance system whose primary elements were NATO and Japan. That system is in degradation, in part for reasons having little to do with the United States, but increasingly for reasons directly related to the policies and attitudes under the present administration.

This trend, if neglected, points towards a situation in which the United States could ultimately stand alone in a hostile world. It is necessary to develop a second-generation alliance system that will serve the long-term security requirements of its participants.

Unlike America's European allies, Japan has a military that is being carefully developed into an impressive regional force. Nevertheless, there is a growing sense that Japan faces rising challenges to its physical security, principally from China. Over time, Japanese experts see reduced American ability to maintain regional stability, and they fear that at the end of the road there may well be a Chinese-American war, probably triggered by a clash over Taiwan. Japanese experts are deeply concerned that the United States' determination to build a ballistic missile defense system will stimulate the Chinese to exceed American expectations by increasing the size of their nuclear forces, rather than by merely deploying more modern systems. They worry that India might be compelled to increase its forces to offset China, thereby further stimulating a nuclear race with Pakistan. They have good reason for concern about North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

The present administration aims to fundamentally change foreign policy. What is to be abandoned is the goal of a world system based on multilateral institutions, underwritten by security alliances anchored in the United States. In place of these things, what is intended is a world order serving US interests, based on US military and economic primacy, although to the maximum extent possible avoiding American engagement in long-range tasks. The issue to be thinking about is not how to go back but how to go forward. The United States needs a second-generation alliance system. Europe and the United States can take steps to make sure that the emerging Rapid Reaction Force¹ is precisely that part of NATO that has been equipped and trained to fight together with the United States in out-of-area² engagements.

Europeans should focus on understanding the revolutionary trends in US military capabilities and doctrines, and plan to have a Rapid Reaction Force develop in such a way as to intercept those capabilities in a certain number of years. This is substantially less demanding in technological and financial terms than trying to upgrade the alliance as a whole. Japan must find a way to cut, or at least loosen, its constitutional Gordian knot ³. Essential forms of future cooperation with America should be identified and ways should be found either to design these forms to make them compatible with the Japanese constitution or to change the constitution to help Japan and the United States to improve their mutual security relationship.

That issue comes to its sharpest edge in terms of ballistic missile defense. Right now the Japanese assume that their constitution bars any integrated US-Japanese defense against ballistic missiles. That is a negative consequence, because it blocks effective cooperation against the most dynamic part of the security threat facing Japan. There may be ways to work around this problem; the United States and Japan should be making it a very high priority to find them. The United States especially needs to offer an overall idea of how to bring Asia through a period when power relations will be changing to a new equilibrium reflecting China's rapidly growing importance. Washington should aim to do this at least in the first instance by means other than military force.

It should work to bring about constructive change in China and a benign regional adjustment to growing Chinese power. The goal here need not be a formal alliance but rather region-wide interest in collective security, capable of generating coalitions for specific purposes and possessing the means for effective joint operations with the United States.

In both Europe and Asia, governments most friendly to America deeply believe that the purposes of alliance now also extend to the need for collective, forward engagement against environmental collapse and poverty. To the extent that US allies neglect to maintain the capacity for basic collective military defense⁴, they are forgetting or ignoring the lessons of history. But to the extent that the United States tries to minimize its engagement with any issues other than physical security, it is failing the prime obligation of leadership: to chart a future worthy of the aspirations of all.

The largest goals of a second-generation alliance system are no longer strictly regional, but global. They are no longer purely military, but societal. For such purposes, the United States is still the indispensable nation, not by custom or some version of divine right but by clear vision and commitment.

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