Seminar 4. H. P. Grice and Theory of Conversation

Tasks and Questions

References

Some Examples

(Mainly of Explicit Performative Utterances)

^ "I now pronounce you man and wife." – used in the course of a marriage ceremony.

^ "Go" – used in ordering someone to go.

^ "Yes" – answering the question "Do you promise to do the dishes?"

^ "You are under arrest." – used in setting someone under arrest.

^ "I christen you".

^ "I accept your apology".

^ "I sentence you to death".

^ "I divorce you, I divorce you, I divorce you" (Islamic: Talaq-i-Bid'ah or triple Talaq).

^ "I do" – wedding.

^ "I swear to do that", "I promise to be there".

^ "I apologize".

^ "I dedicate this..." (...book to my wife, etc.)

^ "This meeting is now adjourned", "The court is now in session".

^ "This church is hereby desanctified".

^ "War is declared".

1. Andersson J. S. How to Define ‘Performative’ / Jan S. Andersson. – Stockholm: Libertryck, 1975.

2. Austin J. L. How to Do Things with Words / John L. Austin. – Oxford: Clarendon, 1962.

3. Austin J. L. Performative Utterances / John L. Austin // Philosophical Papers / [J. O. Urmson, G. J. Warnock (eds.)]. – Oxford: Clarendon, 1961.

4. Bach K. How Performatives Really Work: A Reply to Searle / Kent Bach, Robert M. Harnish // Linguistics and Philosophy. – 1992. – vol. 15. – P. 93-110.

5. Jacobsen K. H. How to Make the Distinction between Constative and Performative Utterances / Klaus H. Jacobsen // The Philosophy Quarterly. – 1985. – vol. 21 (85).

6. Performativity and Performance / [Andrew Parker, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (eds.)]. – New York: Routledge, 1995. – 239 p.

7. Searle J. R. How Performatives Work / John R. Searle // Linguistics and Philosophy. – 1989. – vol. 12. – P. 535-558.

1. Why did J. L. Austin find great difficulty in drawing a completely clear distinction between “performatives” and “constantives”?

2. Define the term “performative”. Dwell on its origin and categories.

3. What does J. L. Austin mean when says that a sentence is “unhappy”?

4. What is the essence of the “hereby” test? How does it work?

5. How can we distinguish performatives from other utterances?

6. Are performatives truth-evaluable? Why? Prove your answer.

7. What is the essence of E. Sedgwick’s dichotomy of performatives? Do you agree with her?

Issues Discussed:

1. H. P. Grice’s definition of conversational implicature

2. H. P. Grice’s cooperative principle and conversational maxims

3. Conversational implicature and its characteristics

4. Conversational implicature versus conventional implicature

5. Particularized and generalized conversational implicatures

6. Other types of conversational implicature

7. Implicature versus entailment

8. H. P. Grice’s theory of meaning and communicative intentions

H. P. Grice’s Definition of Conversational Implicature

In the series of lectures at Harvard University in 1967, the English language philosopher Herbert Paul Grice (1913 - 1988) outlined an approach to what he termed conversational implicature – how hearers manage to work out the complete message when speakers mean more than they say. The term refers to what is suggested in an utterance, even though not expressed nor strictly implied (that is, entailed) by the utterance [3, p. 189]. For example, the sentence “Mary had a baby and got married” strongly suggests that Mary had her baby before the wedding, but the sentence would still be strictly true if Mary had her baby after she got married. Further, if we add the qualification ‘not necessarily in that order’ to the original sentence, then the implicature is cancelled even though the meaning of the original sentence is not altered.

H. P. Grice emphasized the distinction Voltaire makes in our opening quotation between what words mean, what the speaker literally says when using them, and what the speaker means or intends to communicate by using those words, which often goes considerably beyond what is said. In the utterance “Have you got any cash on you?” the speaker really wants the hearer to understand the meaning: “Can you lend me some money? I don’t have much on me.” Or, say, I ask you to lunch and you reply: "I have a one o'clock class I'm not prepared for." You have conveyed to me that you will not be coming to lunch, although you haven't literally said so. You intend for me to figure out that by indicating a reason for not coming to lunch (the need to prepare your class) you intend to convey that you are not coming to lunch for that reason. The study of such conversational implicatures is the core of Grice's influential theory.

Grice's so-called theory of conversation starts with a sharp distinction between what someone says and what someone ‘implicates’ by uttering a sentence. What someone says is determined by the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered and contextual processes of disambiguation and reference fixing; what he implicates is associated with the existence to some rational principles and maxims governing conversation. What is said has been widely identified with the literal content of the utterance; what is implicated, the implicature, with the non-literal, what it is (intentionally) communicated, but not said, by the speaker. Consider his initial example: “ A and B are talking about a mutual friend, C, who is now working in a bank. A asks B how C is getting on in his job, and B replies: ‘ Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been to prison yet’ ” [8, p. 24].

What did B say by uttering "he hasn't been to prison yet"? Roughly, all he literally said of C was that he hasn't been to prison up to the time of utterance. This is what the conventional sentence meaning plus contextual processes of disambiguation, precisification of vague expressions and reference fixing provide.

But, normally, B would have implicated more than this: that C is the sort of person likely to yield to the temptation provided by his occupation.

The conversational implicature is a message that is not found in the plain sense of the sentence. The speaker implies it. The hearer is able to infer (work out, read between the lines) this message in the utterance by appealing to the rules governing successful conversational interaction.

According to Grice, the ‘calculation’ of conversational implicatures is grounded on:

· common knowledge of what the speaker has said (or better, the fact that he has said it),

· the linguistic and extra linguistic context of the utterance,

· general background information,

· the consideration of what Grice dubs the ‘cooperative principle (CP)’: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” [8, p. 26].

H. P. Grice’s Cooperative Principle and Conversational Maxims

The success of a conversation depends upon the various speakers’ approach to the interaction. H. P. Grice proposes that in ordinary conversation, speakers and hearers share a cooperative principle – the way in which people try to make conversations work. Speakers shape their utterances to be understood by hearers. We can understand it partly by noting those people who are exceptions to the rule, and are not capable of making the conversation work. We may also, sometimes, find it useful deliberately to infringe or disregard it – as when we receive an unwelcome call from a telephone salesperson, or where we are being interviewed by a police officer on suspicion of some terrible crime.

The cooperative principle can be explained by four underlying rules or maxims:

[ Quantity

v Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).

v Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. It should be neither too little, nor too much.

[ Quality

v (Supermaxim): Try to make your contribution one that is true.

v (Submaxims):

§ Do not say what you believe to be false.

§ Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

[ Relation

v Make your contribution clearly relevant to the purpose of the exchange.

[ Manner

v (Supermaxim): Be perspicuous.

v (Submaxims):

§ Avoid obscurity of expression.

§ Avoid ambiguity.

§ Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).

§ Be orderly.

§ Frame whatever you say in the form most suitable for any reply that would be regarded as appropriate; or, facilitate in your form of expression the appropriate reply [10, p. 273].

Grice sees the principles governing conversation as derived from general principles governing human rational cooperative action. There has been much discussion about the CP and the maxims. Are all of them necessary? Do we need more? Are they normative or descriptive? What's their exact role in the theory of implicatures: Are they principles that speakers and hearers are assumed to observe in rational communication, or simply theorist's tools for rational reconstruction? Does the CP require from speaker and hearer further cooperation towards a common goal beyond that of understanding and being understood? What is clear is that Grice attributes to these principles an essential role for the definition and the interpretation of conversational implicatures.

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