Regional integration

USA

Russia

Turkey

Iran

China

In the last period rapidly developing country has all premises to play important role in the region. There oil and gas interests as well as separatist tendencies of Uygur nations in western Autonomous Province of Xinjiang (last clashes are from autumn 2000). The solution of Beijing is massive investments to this region with immigration from central regions of China (same model as in Tibet) and this economical increase strengthen relationships with the frontier countries (in 2000 there was the agreement signed among the states of Shanghai Group about the limitations of army on the common borders (in China it means redislocation of these forces to Tibet).

China has interest in exploitation of Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas. In 1998 treaty about the construction of pipelines from western Kazakhstan and eastern Turkmenistan respectively was signed. However, this project is not materialized due to lack of money and now it seems as long-term matter.

But Central Asian countries realised the importance of China for themselves. There is interest in regional cooperation and business contacts development between China and Central Asia, mainly Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Opening railway line through Jungarian Pass extended commercial exchange. Due to the participation of all interested states in Shanghai Group China is becoming important player in Eastern parts of the region, although the influence in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan or Tajikistan stays quite marginal.

In the first half of 90s Iran was consider from the side of Western scholars as dangerous element in the New Caspian Sea Game because of its potential Islamic extremist threats of Islamic Republic of Iran caused by Khomeini´s policy of the export of the Islamic universal ideology. This „hysteria“ was caused by the recent history of Islamic revolution in Iran and the fact that Iran is, along with Iraq, major enemy in Middle East in the eyes of US State Department and subject of double containment policy. USA struggle for marginalizing the importance of Iran and changes in Iranian internal policy caused very pragmatic economical attitude towards Central Asia. Islamic rhetoric from Iran could not be successful due to two reasons:

1 The majority of Central Asians are followers of very mild Hanafi madhab with important Sufi tradition. On the other side Iran with Shi´a as official religion as well as antisufi tendencies in Iran is in contrast with Sunni Muslims.

2 During 70 years of strong atheistic propaganda left religious vacuum in the region and even before October Revolution 1917 the population there had very low level of Islamic feeling. The exception are settled nations in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where the most famous Islamic centres such as Bukhara, Samarkand, Khiva or Khokand were placed. But Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Turkmen tribes were very little influenced by Islam. In the later period of perestroika in the USSR and first years of independence we can see rising of Muslim practice, opening of new mosques, support of Islamic states (Saudi Arabia). Despite this position of Political Islam is still quite less significant than in other Muslim countries. Main threat of extremist Islam does not come from Iran, but from Afghanistan.

Main problem of Iran in economical expansion to the region are wrong relationships with USA, one of the most important state in Post-Soviet affairs, and very law interest of American foreign policy to improve these relations.

In comparison of other countries (except of Russia and China), Iran is strategic country in alternative transport connection from Central Asia. Iranian ports are the nearest sea points to export Central Asian products. In contrary Iran finds outlet north of its border as very lucrative and this fact is visible in many local markets, which are full of Iranian products.

But Iran can also play highly important role in the transport of strategic materials – especially Turkmen gas. Turkmenistan has interest to access south Asian markets – Pakistan and India, which could be implement in construction of the pipeline to south. US – Saudi – Pakistan consortium of companies, which wanted to build the pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan, clashed due to continuing instability in Afghanistan and this fact turned Turkmen attention to realise this project through Iran. But US side refused to provide support to this variant.

In geopolitical context Iran consult its steps in Central Asian affairs in collaboration with Russia in frames of the coalition Russia – Armenia – Iran with possible China’s interests. The countries of this alliance consulted together their attitude in Caspian Sea, Tajik or Afghan affairs.

Immediately after declaration of independence in Central Asian republics in 1991, Turkey was one of the first countries establishing diplomatic relations with new independent Turkic states. There was clear strategy of cultural and economical influence through the “help of brother countries”. Turkey also counted to be a mediator between newly independent states and West. Turkey could also presented itself as strategic partner of USA.

In 90s some comparative disadvantages of Turkey in relations with Central Asia were discovered. Firstly there is geographical position – Turkey is isolated of Central Asia by Iran with very complicated relations and uncertain The Transcaucasia, where the only real ally of Turkey became ethnically close Azerbaijan. Turkey also was not economical able to provide strong financial aid expected by Central Asian countries.

Other “brother” Turkic states of Central Asia declared Turkey as the example of their future development, however, in fact, the states in most cases include Turkey as one of the directions of their multivector policy.

We must count Turkey into potential key players in the region due to fact of close relations with USA and Europe. It is necessary to realise, that more and more Central Asian students use the offers of Ankara to study in Turkey. It is also connected with decline of influx of students to Russia as it had been previously. This factor will play its role in the future after changes on Central Asian „thrones“, when new cadres, often educated in Turkey will take the power. But if Ankara will not interrupt its attention towards its „brother states“, we can see the crop of sweet fruits in next 10 or 20 years.

Despite economical failure in 90s Russia is one of the most serious candidates in New Central Asian Game. In the first half of 90s stayed the only way for connection with Europe and so far the greatest part of transport to Europe go across the northern neighbour of Kazakhstan, although there is already mentioned connection through Iran.

After appointment of Yevgenij Primakov and starting of so called Primakov´s doctrine with the conception of „Near abroad“ the interest in Central Asia and Caucasus raised. But the role of Russia stayed less important in Central Asia, because of lack of concrete steps in this direction.

In the very last few month new Russian president Putin has realised the importance of the region and lowering role of Russia. It is not mere fluke, that one of the first foreign trip of Putin as the head of Russia lead to Central Asia, especially to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where Russian positions were the weakest. Change from „great power thinking“ to pragmatic attitude to influence the region through economical interest has been observed.

The strongest position of Russia is in two smallest states – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Both countries realised that strategic partnership and good relations with Russia are their foremost interests in foreign policy. Due to 6600 km long, almost absolutely open frontier with Russia the same interest has also Kazakhstan.

These states are also members of so called Shanghai Group together with China a Russia and Custom Union with Russia and Byelorussia, the only regional cooperation treaties and integration organization, which are not only on the paper.

Russian military presence in Tajikistan forms, according to Russian interpretation, „barrier against Islamic extremism and narcobusiness from Afghanistan.“ And the events in southern Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan during last two summers, when militant group of narcoboss Juma Nomongoni under the Islamic flags fought against regular Kyrgyz/Uzbek armies, only confirmed these fears.

These events showed, that Central Asian states are not capable to defend them without international aid provided only from Russia, which has realised the threat of extending „Islamic extremism“ from south. Russian military aid during operations in Batken in 1999 and 2000 brought lot of points of sympathy to Russia and tighter connection of Central Asia with Moscow. In this step Russia solved two problems – relations with Central Asian states and defence of national interests.

Russia in the first half of 90s played also „Russian card“, when hundreds of thousands Russians remained beyond frontier of their mother country and Russian minorities forming usually the majority of local intelligentsia in new states became means of pressure to the administration of NIS.

In current period it seems that Russia will play main role in three states of Custom Union or Shanghai Group – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan in last year turned to Russia again in searching economical aid (the other vectors of Uzbekistan foreign policy became less important because of lowering economical investments to Uzbekistan). The priority for next period in Russian policy towards Central Asian will be developing of cooperation and relations with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and deepening the integration of three other states. First steps were introduced in May 2000 when new economical cooperation treaties with Ashghabat and Tashkent were signed.

Foreign policy of USA is, such as in many other regions, based on bias attitude. Mutual interest on American investments to Central Asian industry (strategic raw material export to USA and share on The New Great Game for US and development of economics from Central Asian point of view). But the American investments are conditioned through pressure on human rights development in frames of American policy of universal democracy. However, this tactic does not work in Central Asian „khanates“. Although new state would welcome American investments, in the situation of such pressure they can turn their attention to other states, which, despite their economical weakness are ready to help in change of the influence in the region – these states are Russia, China and Iran in the first places.

USA is interested to develop the co-operation in strategic alliance with Turkey and Azerbaijan and State Department offers to new states to join this axis.

USA has the essential disadvantage in great distance, which is counterbalance to economical influence. The main task for American foreign policy in this region is diversification oil transit rules, leading out of Russia and Iran mainly. This is the reason of massive support of Baku – Ceyhan pipeline construction, about the economical effectiveness of which many experts dispute. But the evidence of strategic importance of this project is out of doubt and for USA there is great interest in Central Asian countries to join this pipeline to strengthen their positions there.

However, the policy of USA does not bring expected effect due to the interests of other players and also due to regional ambitions of local powers – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and also Turkmenistan.

In 1995 Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan founded Custom Union, later on joined by Tajikistan, anyway depended on Russian help. This step meant establishment of relatively functioned bloc of CIS states. It was evident, that Russia will play main role within this organization with important support of Kazakh president Nazarbayev, who did not give up his idea of Eurasian Union from the 1st half of 90s.

Less successful regional group – Central Asian Economic Union - was established (members are Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), but despite many treaties about establishment of free trade zone, this idea failed mainly because of commercial wars between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan (mentioned above).

In August 1996 representatives of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in Shanghai. The final act – The Treaty of Confidence Building in Military Matters – found new strong bloc, which is know based not only on military, but also on commercial co-operation. Now this „Shanghai Group“ as it was named is concentrated on fight with organized crime (visibly against Afghanistan).

In geopolitical context is necessary to mention geopolitical and geostrategic alliances of Russia – Moscow-Yerevan-Teheran, Moscow-Dilli and Moscow-Beijing axes. All of them are interested to co-operation in Central Asian matters too. On contrary US supported alliance (Tel Aviv-Ankara-Baku) is interested in joining at least Tashkent and Asghabat (and also Astana) to this strategic axis. But this support will also depend on new American Middle East policy.

Uzbekistan and mainly Turkmenistan are out of mentioned integration units. However, Tashkent is interested in joining The Shanghai Group in search of multivector foreign policy. During two seasons of Islamic extremist groups attacks in Central Asia, Uzbekistan was not able to defend effectively itself and president Karimov is forced to search partner, which is able to help the economy and fight against „Islamic terrorists“. This is the reason why he turned his attention to Russia and especially The Shanghai Group.

Very extraordinary case is Turkmenistan and regime of its president Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, who proclaimed strict neutrality. He has interest to join Ankara – Baku alliance, but he also wish to keep important Iranian vector of Turkmen foreign policy and this policy does not have support of USA. But this alliance is run for long distance with uncertain results, so it is possible to suppose, that Turkmenbashi will use new offer for co-operation with Russia, but with diversification in Iranian direction.

Дата добавления: 2015-05-09