Глоссарий 6 страница. [688] R. Boyd, ‘Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail’, N

[688] R. Boyd, ‘Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail’, N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 87 – 88.

[689] Там же, 94.

[690] См. там же: 99 – 100.

[691] Там же, 101.

[692] См.: N. Block, ‘What is Functionalism?’, N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980.

[693] G. Mandler, ‘Consciousness: Respectable, Useful, and Probably Necessary’, R. Solso (ed.), Information Processing and Cognition: The Loyola Symposium, Hillsdale: Erlbaum Press, 1975, 229.

[694] Ср.: G. Güzeldere, “Approaching Consciousness” (“The Many Faces of Consciousness: A Field Guide”), The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Güzeldere (eds.), A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Masachusetts, 1997, 17.

[695] T. Shallice, ‘Dual Funсtions of Consciousness’, The Psychological Review, 79:5, 1972, 383 – 393.

[696] См.: G. Güzeldere, “Approaching Consciousness” (“The Many Faces of Consciousness: A Field Guide”), The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Güzeldere (eds.), A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Masachusetts, 1997, 18.

[697] D. Lewis, ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’, Journal of Philosophy, 63, 1, 1966, 166.

[698] D. M. Armstrong, ‘The Causal Theory of the Mind’, Neue Heft für Philosophie, no. 11, 1977, 88.

[699] См.: N. Block, ‘What is Functionalism?’, N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 175 – 177.

[700] Там же, 177 и далее.

[701] D. Lewis, ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50, 1972, 249 – 258.

[702] D. Lewis, ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 216 – 222.

[703] D. Lewis, ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, V. 1, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, 208 – 209.

[704] D. Armstrong, ‘The Nature of Mind’, C. V. Brost (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory, London, Macmillan, 1970, 67 – 79.

[705] В: H. Putnam, ‘The Nature of Mental States’, W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967, 37 – 48.

[706] Jaegwon Kim, ‘Physicalism and the Multiple Realisability of Mental States’, “Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws, and the Identity Theory”, Monist 56, no. 2, 1972, 177 – 192.

[707] N. Block, ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, C. W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition. Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978, 261 – 325.

[708] S. Shoemaker, ‘Functionalism and Qualia’, Philosophical Studies 27, 1975, 291 – 315.

[709] Критик может счесть не вполне убедительным этот переход от качественных характеров к качественным состояниям: почему иметь определенный качественный характер, находясь в том или ином ментальном состоянии, должно означать нахождение в определенном качественном состоянии?

[710] N. Block and J. Fodor, ‘What Psychological States Are Not?’, Philosophical Review 81, no. 2, 1972, 159 – 181.

[711] N. Block, ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, C. W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition. Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978, 261 – 325.

[712] См.: J. Fodor, The Language of Thought, N. Y. Crowell, 1975, особенно: Ch. 2.

[713] M. Tye, ‘A Representational Theory of Pains and their Phenomenal Character’, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 9, Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1990, 236.

[714] См.: M. Davis, ‘Externalism and Experience’, A. Clark, J. Ezquerro, and J. M. Larrazabal, Philosophy And Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness, and Reasoning, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, 1 – 33.

[715] C. Peacocke, A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1992, 61 – 62.

[716] G. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982, 104, n. 22.

[717] См.: N. Block, ‘Mental Pictures and Cognitive Science’, Philosophical Review, 93, 1983, 499 – 542.

[718] См.: M. Tye, ‘A Representational Theory of Pains and their Phenomenal Character’, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 9, Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1990.

[719] Там же, 225.

[720] C. Peacocke, ‘Sensation and Content of Experience: A Distinction’, Sense and Content, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, 4 – 26.

[721] J. Hintikka, ‘Information, Causality and the Logic of Perception’, The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modality, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975, 60.

[722] См.: C. Peacocke, ‘Sensation and Content of Experience: A Distinction’, Sense and Content, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, 4 – 26.

[723] F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Sandpoint, N. Y., Humanities Press, 1973 (оригинальное издание 1874 г.), 88 – 89, 121.

[724] J. Fodor, ‘Too hard for our kind of mind?’, London Review of Books, 13:12, 1991, 12.

[725] D. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992, 132.

[726] Более подробную экспозицию этих споров см.: G. Güzeldere, “Approaching Consciousness” (“The Many Faces of Consciousness: A Field Guide”), The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Güzeldere (eds.), A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Masachusetts, 1997, 22 – 23.

[727] L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, 172 – 173.

[728] Такую классификацию предлагает: C. McGinn, ‘Consciousness and Content’, The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Güzeldere (eds.), A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Masachusetts, 1997, 295 – 307.

[729] T. Burge, ‘Individualism and Psychology’, Philosophical Review, vol. 95, 1986, 3 – 45.

[730] Там же.

[731] M. Davis, ‘Externalism and Experience’, The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Güzeldere (eds.), A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Masachusetts, 1997, 314.

[732] См.: G. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982, а также: C. McGinn, Mental Content, Oxford, Basil: Blackwell, 1989.

[733] M. Davis, ‘Externalism and Experience’, The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Güzeldere (eds.), A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Masachusetts, 1997, 317.

[734] T. Burge, ‘Individualism and Psychology’, Philosophical Review, vol. 95, 1986, 39.

[735] M. Davis, ‘Externalism and Experience’, The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Güzeldere (eds.), A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Masachusetts, 1997, 317 – 318.

[736] R. J. Matthews, ‘Comments (on Burge’s “Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception”)’, R. H. Grimm and D. D. Merill (eds.), Contents of Rhought, Tucson, AZ.: University of Arizona Press, 1988, 77 – 86.

[737] Там же.

[738] Вероятно, вопросы онтологии сознания далеко не настолько существенны для науки о сознании, чтобы признавать онтологический консенсус достаточным условием консенсуса, требуемого для объяснения сознания, хотя они весьма существенны для философии.

[739] Рорти Р. Американская философия сегодня // Аналитическая философия (антология). М.: ДИК, 1998. с. 433 — 453.

[740] См. об этом: Tugendhat E. Description as the Method of Philosophy // Linguistic Analysis and Phenomenology. London and Basingstoke. The Macmillian press ltd, 1972. pp. 256 — 266.

[741] См.: Hems J. M. Husserl and/or Wittgenstein // Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. The Hague, 1976. pp. 56 — 84.

[742] См. об этом: Follesdal D. Introduction to Phenomenology for Analytic Philosophers // Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia. Baltimor and London: The Johns Hopkins press, 1972. pp. 417 — 429.

[743] См. об этом: Husserl E. Logische Untersuchungen. Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen, Bd. 2, Teil. 1, 1980. и Frege G. Über Sinn und Bedeutung // Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100, 1892. S. 25 – 50.

[744] См. об этом: Frege G. Review of Dr. E. Husserl’s “Philosophy of Arithmetic” // Mind, vol. LXXXI, № 323, 1972. pp. 321 – 337.

[745] Husserl E. Logische Untersuchungen. Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen, Bd. 2, Teil. 1, 1980. S. 161.

[746] Фреге Г. Смысл и значение // Фреге Г. Избранные работы. М.: ДИК, 1997. с. 28.

[747] Dummett M. Frege. Philosophy of Language. Harper & Row Publishers. New York; Evanston, San Francisco, London, 1973. p. 179.

[748] Solomon R. Sense and Essence: Frege and Husserl // Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. The Hague, 1976. p. 47.

[749] Tragesser R. S. Husserl and realism in Logic and Mathematics. Cambridge University press, 1984. p. 12.

[750] Dummett M. Frege. Philosophy of Language. Harper & Row Publishers. New York; Evanston, San Francisco, London, 1973. p. 683.

[751] Кюнг Г. Мир как ноэма и как референт // Аналитическая философия (антология). М.: ДИК, 1998. c. 302.

[752] Dummett M. Frege. Philosophy of Language. Harper & Row Publishers. New York; Evanston, San Francisco, London, 1973. p. 153.

[753] Гуссерль Э. Картезианские размышления. СПб.: Наука, Ювента, 1998. с. 84.

[754] Ricoeur P. Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language // Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. The Hague, 1976. p. 89.

[755] См.: Витгенштейн Л. Логико-философский трактат // Витгенштейн Л. Философские работы. М.: Гнозис, 1994. Ч 1. с. 6 – 12.

[756] См. по этому поводу: Суровцев В. Автономия логики: Источники, генезис и система раннего Витгенштейна. Томск, 2001.

[757] Ricoeur P. Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language // Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. The Hague, 1976. p. 90.

[758] Dummett M. The Logical Basis of Metaphisics. Cambridge, Massachusetts; Harvard University Press, 1991. p. 1.

[759] См. по этому поводу: Church A. Introduction to Mathematical Logic, vol. 1, Princeton, 1956.

[760] Кюнг Г. Мир как ноэма и как референт // Аналитическая философия (антология). М.: ДИК, 1998. с. 307.

[761] Solomon R. Sense and Essence: Frege and Husserl // Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. The Hague, 1976. p. 50.

[762] См.: Apel K.-O. Linguistic Meaning and Intentionality: The Relationship of the a priori of Language and the a priori of Consciousness in Light of a Transcendental Semiotic or Linguistic Pragmatic // Phenomenology and beyond: The Self and its Language. Dordrecht, Boston, London; Kluwer academic publichers, 1989. pp. 102 –118; Указать русский перевод. Апель К.-О. Развитие «аналитической философии языка» и проблема «наук о духе» // Апель К.-О. Трансформация философии. М., 2001. с. 103 – 170.

[763] См.: Ihde D. Some Paralleles between Analysis and Phenomenology // Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. The Hague, 1976. pp. 56 — 84.

[764] См.: Pettit P. On Phenomenology as a Methodology of Philosophy // Linguistic Analysis and Phenomenology. London and Basingstoke. The Mcmillian press ltd, 1972. pp. 241 — 255.

[765] Haaparanta L. Analysis as the method of Logical Discovery: Some Remarks on Frege and Husserl // Synthese by Kluwer Academic Publishes 77 (1988). pp. 73 — 97.

[766] Wittgenstein L. The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford, 1958. p. 18.

[767] Tugendhat E. Description as the Method of Philosophy // Linguistic Analysis and Phenomenology. London and Basingstoke. The Macmillian press ltd, 1972. p. 262.

[768] Ibid., p. 284.

[769] Husserl E. Logische Untersuchungen. Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen, Bd. 2, Teil 2, 1980. S. 36-37.

[770] Wittgenstein L. Vermischte Bemerkungen. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrhamp, 1977. S. 27.

[771] Husserl E. Logische Untersuchungen. Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen, Bd. 2, Teil 2, 1980. S. 465.

[772] Ibid., S. 580.

[773] Фреге Г. Логические исследования. Томск: Водолей, 1997. c. 28.

[774] Гуссерль Э. Идеи к чистой феноменологии и феноменологической философии. М.: ДИК, 1999. c. 111.

[775] Гуссерль Э. Картезианские размышления. СПб.: Наука, Ювента, 1998. c. 346.

[776] Фреге Г. Логические исследования. Томск: Водолей, 1997. с. 28.

[777] Там же, с. 28.

[778] См. по этому поводу: Ладов В. А. Язык феноменологии // Актуальные проблемы социальных и гуманитарных наук. Томск: Изд-во Том. ун-та, 2002. с. 40 — 47.

[779] Mohanty J. N. Husserl, Frege and the Overcoming of Psychologism // Philosophy and Science in Phenomenological Perspective. Dordrecht, 1984. p. 148.

[780] Husserl E. Logische Untersuchungen. Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen, Bd. 2, Teil. 1, 1980. S. 40.

[781] См.: Grice P. Studies in the Ways of World. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1989.

[782] См.: Searle, J. R. Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge, 1969; Searle, J. R. Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, 1982; и др. работы. Указать работу «Что такое интенциональное состояние?» на русском, а также работу «Открывая сознание заново».

[783] См.: Райл Г. Понятие сознания. М., 1999.

[784] См.: Bergmann G. Intentionality // Intentionality, Mind and Language. Ed.: A. Marras. Urbana; University of Illionis press, 1972. pp. 287 – 320.

[785] См.: Chisholm R. M. Sentences about Believing // Intentionality, Mind and Language. Ed.: A. Marras. Urbana; University of Illionis press, 1972. pp. 31 – 51.

[786] См.: Sellars W. Notes on Intentionality // Intentionality, Mind and Language. Ed.: A. Marras. Urbana; University of Illinois press, 1972. pp. 321 — 334.

[787] См.: Остин Д. Избранное. М.: ДИК, 1999.

[788] См., например: Smith B. Towards a History of Speech Act Theory // Speech Acts, Meanings and Intentions. Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of John R. Searle, Berlin/New York: de Gruyter (1990), 29-61; Thompson D. Intentionality and Causality in John Searle // Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 16 (1986). p. 83-97.

51 См: David L. Thompson. On Naturalizing Intentionality // http://ucs.mun.ca/~davidt/index.html. (Текст доклада, прочитанного Д. Томпсоном на ежегодном заседании Канадской философской ассоциации в 1986).

52 См.: Smith B. Logic and Formal Ontology // Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook. Lanham: University Press of America, 1989. p. 29.

53 Husserl E. Logical Investigations, 2 vols. New York: Humanities Press, 1970. pp. 571-572.

54 D. Dennet (with J. Haugeland) Intentionality // The Oxford Companion to the Mind, in R. L. Gregory, ed., Oxford University Press 1987.

[789] См., например: Gallagher S. Mutual Enlightment: Resent Phenomenology in Cognitive Science // Journal of Consciousness Studies 4, № 3, 1997. p. 195 — 214.

[790] Frege, G. Selected Writings. Trans. by M.Black and P.Geach. Ox., 1952.

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