Current WMD proliferation threats

Nuclear and radioactive material

The continued presence of fissile and radioactive material in the countries of Central Asia poses

a persistent proliferation risk. Obtaining fissile material such as highly enriched uranium (HEU) or

plutonium is one of the most important steps separating terrorists from a nuclear device of very

destructive power, while acquiring certain types of radioactive material is the principal hurdle to

creating a radiation dispersal device (RDD) or "dirty bomb". Central Asia is a potential source for both

types of material.

HEU remains at several sites in Central Asia. Kazakhstan has three HEU-fuelled research reactors,9

and its overall amount of HEU is believed to be about 10,590–10,940kg.10 The Mangyshlak Atomic

Energy Combine (MAEK) in Aktau, Kazakhstan, is the site of the BN-350 fast breeder reactor, which

produced plutonium prior to being shut down in 1999.11 To date, 2,900kg of HEU fuel from BN-350

have been removed to the fuel processing facility in Ust-Kamenogorsk and blended down to lowenriched

uranium (LEU);12 the remaining material at the facility includes spent fuel that contains some

three tons of better than weapon-grade plutonium.13 While this material is packed in special casks

and stored at MAEK's storage pool, reducing the risks of theft,14 spent fuel constitutes a proliferation

four • 2007 central asia at the crossroads

risk due to its high plutonium component; it will be better secured only by being removed from the

facility completely and placed in long-term storage.15 Concerns about security are partly driven by

Aktau's location on the shore of the Caspian Sea. The United States Department of Energy (DOE)

assists Kazakhstan with providing long-term storage. In its most recent budget request (for fiscal year

2008), the DOE is asking for US$ 31.7 million for this purpose. It is planned that all BN-350 spent fuel

will be moved to the Baikal waste site (at Semipalatinsk) by 2010.16

Uzbekistan has one operating HEU-fuelled research reactor.17 In 2004 the United States

repatriated 11kg of fresh HEU fuel assemblies from Tashkent to the Russian Federation, and in April

2006 63kg of spent HEU fuel were transported to the Mayak facility in Russia. Uzbekistan now has less

than 56kg of HEU (all of which is irradiated fuel), and has committed to converting its only operating

reactor to LEU.18

Lax accounting for fissile material during the Soviet era provides grounds for concern that not

all the fissile material in Central Asia may be accounted for. The Soviet system encouraged facility

managers to manipulate production figures, even those involving

fissile material. The nuclear facilities would produce extra uranium or

plutonium without registering it as insurance against a possible shortfall

in future production.19 There can be no guarantee that the region is clear of all fissile material, although

there is no evidence of significant amounts of unaccounted material in Central Asia.

Another potential proliferation threat in Central Asia is the significant number of "orphan"

radiation sources. These are sources abandoned by medical, scientific and industrial users who are

either unable or unwilling to dispose of them properly, leaving them vulnerable to theft. Some of these

sources could be used in unsophisticated radiological devices. It is also possible that sources could be

stolen from industrial, medical or research facilities currently in use. According to the chairman of the

Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee, Timur Zhantikin, and based on Soviet-era data, about 100,000

radiation sources were present in Kazakhstan in 1992. In 2005, Kazakh government officials admitted

that they were unaware of the whereabouts of at least 20,000 radiation sources still believed to be in

the country.20 That same year it was announced that Kazakhstan would start a nationwide inventory

of radioactive sources used by industrial enterprises and institutions, as well as search for orphan

radioactive sources. It is believed that this process is under way. Also in 2005, and despite domestic

instability in the aftermath of the "Tulip Revolution", Kyrgyzstan managed to conduct a partial search

for lost or abandoned radioactive sources. About 1,000 items of radioactive material deemed to be

vulnerable to theft or terrorism were secured or disposed of by October 2005. According to Kyrgyz

authorities, there were 500 additional items to secure, and an unidentified amount of radioactive

material was still missing.21

Plan of the lecture:

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