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Admiral Nakhimov (ship collision)




Major disasters

Causes

Approximately 80 percent of all aviation accidents occur shortly before, after, or during takeoff or landing, and are often described as resulting from ‘human error’; mid-flight disasters are rare but not entirely unheard of. Among other things, the latter have been caused by bombs, as in the 1988 Lockerbie incident, mid-air collisions such as in the 2002 Überlingen crash and structural failure, as in the 1954 Comet disasters and 1988 Aloha Airlines incident.

An accident survey of 1,843 aircraft accidents from 1950 through 2006 determined the causes to be as follows:

· 53%: Pilot error

· 21%: Mechanical failure

· 11%: Weather

· 8%: Other human error (air traffic controller error, improper loading of aircraft, improper maintenance, fuel contamination, language miscommunication etc.)

· 6%: Sabotage (bombs, hijackings, shoot-downs)

· 1%: Other cause

The survey excluded military, private, and charter aircraft.

Aircraft manufacturers are often slow to accept that aspects of design might play a role in accident causation, finding it more convenient to state that human crew members were responsible. In fact, the complex interaction between the human crew and the aircraft often creates a fertile ground in which human error may flourish.

The crash of Japan Airlines Flight 123 in 1985 is the single-aircraft disaster with the highest number of fatalities. In this crash, 520 died on board a Boeing 747. The aircraft suffered an explosive decompression which destroyed its vertical stabilizer and severed hydraulic lines, making the 747 virtually uncontrollable.

The deadliest aviation-related disaster of any kind with the highest number of total fatalities, including fatalities on both the aircraft and the ground, was the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001, which occurred along with the intentional crashing of American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175. 2,974 people were killed, mostly rescue workers and the occupants of the destroyed buildings.

 

 

The Admiral Nakhimov, originally named Berlin III, was a ship used originally by Germany, but later converted to a Soviet passenger ship. On August 31, 1986, Admiral Nakhimov collided with a large bulk carrier “Pyotr Vasyov” in the Tsemes Bay, near the port of Novorossiysk. In total, 423 of the 1,234 people on board died.

Sinking

At 10:00 p.m. Moscow Time on August 31, 1986, the Admiral Nakhimov sailed from Novorossiysk en route to Sochi, its next stop. There were 888 passengers and 346 crew members aboard. Most of the passengers were Ukrainian, with others from Moldavia, the Baltic republics and Central Asia. The captain of the ship was Vadim Markov.

Just minutes into the voyage, the ship’s pilot noticed that the large bulk carrier “Pyotr Vasyov” was on a collision course with the Admiral Nakhimov. The Pyotr Vasyov was carrying a cargo of oats and barley from Canada. The pilot radioed a warning to the Pyotr Vasyov, and the freighter responded, “Don’t worry. We will pass clear of each other. We will take care of everything.”

Despite the message, Captain Viktor Tkachenko of the Pyotr Vasyov did nothing to slow his ship or change course. Convinced that the freighter would pass without incident, Captain Markov of the Admiral Nakhimov retired to his cabin, leaving his second mate Alexander Chudnovsky in charge. From 11 p.m., Chudnovsky radioed Pyotr Vasyov several times, asking about her course and her further actions. Chudnovsky changed the ship’s course 10 degrees portside. At 11:10 p.m., Chundovsky cried on VHF to the freighter, “Immediately reverse full astern!” When it was clear that the freighter was headed directly for the ship, the Pyotr Vasyov’s engines were thrown in reverse. The Admiral Nakhimov turned hard to port, but it was too late.

At 11:12 p.m., the Admiral Nakhimov was struck by the Pyotr Vasyov eight miles (15 km) from the port at Novorossiysk and two miles (4 km) from shore line. While many passengers had gone to bed by this time, some were on deck listening and dancing to a jazz band. They could only watch helplessly as the freighter rammed into the starboard side of the ship at a speed of about 5 knots (9 km/h). The Admiral Nakhimov continued forward with the freighter’s bow in its side, ripping a 900 square foot (84 m²) hole in the hull between the engine and boiler rooms.

The Admiral Nakhimov immediately took on a list on her starboard side, and her lights went out upon impact. After a few seconds, the emergency diesel generator powered on, but the lights went out again two minutes later, plunging the sinking ship into darkness. People below decks found themselves lost in the dark and rapidly canting hallways.

There was no time to launch the lifeboats. Hundreds of people dove into the oily water, clinging to lifejackets, barrels and pieces of debris.

The Admiral Nakhimov sank in only seven minutes. Rescue ships began arriving just 10 minutes after the ship went down. The Pyotr Vasyov was not badly damaged, and assisted in the rescue effort. Sixty-four rescue ships and 20 helicopters rushed to the scene, and 836 people were pulled from the water. Some people were so slick with fuel oil that they could not keep hold of the hands of their rescuers. Sailors had to jump into the water to save people.

The Admiral Nakhimov lacked proper ventilation, which was the reason all 90 windows in the cabins were open during the accident. The bulkheads that would have prevented the ship from sinking were removed during the conversion.

Passengers and crew had had little time to escape, and 423 of the 1,234 on board of the ship lost their lives.

 

 

Beslan school hostage crisis (terrorism)

The Beslan school hostage crisis began when a group of armed rebels, demanding an end to the Second Chechen War, took more than 1,100 people (including some 777 children) hostage on September 1, 2004, at School Number One (SNO) in the town of Beslan. On the third day of the standoff, Russian security forces stormed the building using tanks, rockets and other heavy weapons. A series of explosions shook the school, followed by a fire which engulfed the building and a chaotic gun-battle between the hostage-takers and Russian security forces. Ultimately, at least 334 hostages were killed, including 186 children. Hundreds more were wounded or reported missing.

Chechen separatist warlord Shamil Basayev took responsibility for the hostage taking but blamed the outcome on the then Russian President Vladimir Putin. As of 2008, there are many aspects of the crisis still in dispute, including how many militants were involved, their preparations, and whether some of them had escaped.

The initial attack took place on September 1, the traditional start of the Russian school year, referred to as “First September” or Day of Knowledge. On this day, the children, accompanied by their parents and other relatives, attend ceremonies hosted by their school. Because of the pupils and family members attending the Day of Knowledge festivities, the number of people in the schools was considerably higher than usual for a normal school day.

At 09:30 local time, attackers wearing military camouflage and black balaclava masks, and in some cases also wearing explosive belts, arrived at SNO in a stolen police GAZ van and a GAZ-66 military truck. Many witnesses and independent experts claim that there were, in fact, two groups of attackers, and that the first group was already at the school when the second group arrived by truck.

The attackers took approximately 1,100 to 1,200 hostages (the number was at first downplayed by the government to merely 200-400, and then for an unknown reason announced to be exactly 354). The militants herded their captives into the school’s gym, and confiscated all mobile phones under the threat of death. They ordered everyone to speak in Russian and only when spoken to.

After gathering the hostages in the gym, the attackers selected the male teachers, school employees and fathers, the 15-20 strongest adults, they apparently thought might represent a threat, and took them into a corridor next to the cafeteria on the second floor, where a deadly blast took place. An explosive belt on one of the female bombers detonated, killing another female bomber and several of the selected hostages, as well as mortally wounding one male militant.

A disorganized security cordon was soon established around the school, consisting of the Russian police and Russian Army forces; OSNAZ, including the elite Alfa and Vympel units of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB); and the OMON special units of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). A line of three apartment buildings facing the school gym was evacuated. The perimeter they made was within 250 yards (230 m) of the school. No fire-fighting equipment was in position and, despite the previous experiences of the 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis, there were few ambulances ready.

The attackers mined the gym and the rest of the building with improvised explosive devices, and surrounded it with tripwires. In a further bid to deter rescue attempts, they threatened to kill 50 hostages for every one of their own members killed by the police, and to kill 20 hostages for every gunman injured. They also threatened to blow up the school if government forces attacked. To avoid being overwhelmed by gas attack like their comrades in the 2002 Moscow Dubrovka siege, the rebels quickly smashed the school’s windows. The captors prevented hostages from eating and drinking (calling this a “hunger strike”, which they said they joined too) until North Ossetia’s President Alexander Dzasokhov would arrive to negotiate with them

The Russian government announced that it would not use force to rescue the hostages, and negotiations towards a peaceful resolution took place on the first and second days, at first led by Leonid Roshal, (Roshal had helped negotiate the release of children in the 2002 Moscow siege, but also had also given advice to the Russian security services as they prepared to storm the theater, for which he received the Hero of Russia award). However, a witness statement in the court indicated that the Russian negotiators confused Roshal with Vladimir Rushailo, a Russian security official.

On September 2, 2004, negotiations between Roshal and the hostage-takers proved unsuccessful, and they refused to allow food, water, and medicines to be taken in for the hostages, or for the bodies of the dead to be removed from the front of the school.

The crisis was responded with a near-total silence from President of Russia Vladimir Putin and the rest of Russia’s political leaders. Only on the second day Putin made his first public comment on the siege during a meeting in Moscow with the King Abdullah II of Jordan: “Our main task, of course, is to save the lives and health of those who became hostages. All actions by our forces involved in rescuing the hostages will be dedicated exclusively to this task.” It was the only public statement by Putin about the crisis until one day after its bloody end.

In the afternoon, the gunmen allowed the former President of Ingushetia and retired Soviet Army general, Ruslan Aushev, to enter the school building and released 26 hostages personally to him. The rebels gave Aushev a video tape made in the school and a note with demands from their leader Shamil Basayev who was not himself present in Beslan. The existence of the note was kept secret by the Russian authorities, while the tape was declared being “empty” (later this turned out to be false, too). It was falsely announced that the hostage takers made no demands. In fact, Basayev demanded recognition of a “formal independence for Chechnya” in the frame of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The lack of food and water took its toll on the young children, many of whom were forced to stand for long periods in the hot, tightly-packed gym. Many children took off their clothing because of the sweltering heat within the gymnasium, which led to rumors of sexual impropriety, though the hostages later explained it was merely due to the stifling heat and being denied any water. Many children fainted, and parents feared they would die. Some hostages drank their own urine. Occasionally, the militants (many of whom took off their masks) took out some of the unconscious children and poured water on their heads before returning them to the gym. Later in the day, some adults also started to faint from fatigue and thirst. Because of the conditions in the gym, when the explosion and gun battle began on the third day, many of the surviving children were so fatigued that they were barely able to flee from the carnage.

Part of the sports hall wall was demolished by the explosions, allowing some 14 hostages to escape, though a number were killed as a result of crossfire. Russian officials say militants shot hostages as they ran, and the military fired back. The government asserts that once the shooting started, troops had no choice but to storm the building. However, most of the town’s residents have refuted that official version of events.

A chaotic battle broke out as the Russian militants fought to enter the school. The assault forces included the assault groups of the FSB OSNAZ and the associated troops of the Russian Army and the Russian Interior Ministry, supported by a number of tanks from Russia’s 58th Army, BTR-80 wheeled armored personnel carriers and armed helicopters, including at least one Mi-24 attack helicopter.

Firefighters, who were called two hours after the fire started, were not prepared to battle the blaze that raged in the gymnasium. One fire truck crew arrived two hours later, and the first water came nearly two and a half hours after the start of the fire. Few ambulances were available to transport the hundreds of injured victims, who were driven in private cars.

After the bloody conclusion of the crisis, many of the injured died in the only hospital in Beslan, which was badly unprepared to cope with the casualties, before the patients were sent to better-equipped facilities in Vladikavkaz.

The day after the storming, bulldozers gathered the debris of the building, including the body parts of the victims, and removed it to a garbage dump. Three days after the siege, 180 people were still missing.

 

 




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